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PART I
S.

GRAY**

The modern law of misrepresentation stems from three doctrinal.
streams which have recently begun to converge. It has evolved
principally from the action on the case for deceit. It has also been
influenced by negligence, with which it overlaps and into which it
merges, particularly in connection with the conduct of professions.
And it is affected by developments in the law of products liability as
well as, more generally, the field of consumer protection law, which
tend to condition expectations about the effect of representations in
commercial transactions.
§ 1.

DECEIT AS A SEPARATE TORT

Originally allied to the action for breach of warranty, it was not
until 1789 that an action for deceit was available to one other than a
party to a business transaction with his deceiver. In Pasley v.
Freeman,' it was held by a divided court that one who fraudulently
induced another to extend credit to a person known to be
untrustworthy could be held liable to the person thereby defrauded.
After Pasley, deceit, as a distinct tort, was definitely disassociated
from actions for breach of warranty 2 and the basis for the legal duty
was perceived to be independent of contractual relations between the
parties. The source of the duty is the law and the basis is the
relationship of the parties which usually, but not necessarily,
involves a business transaction between them.
The type of interest protected by the law of deceit is the interest
in formulating business judgments without being misled by others in short, in not being cheated. Generally, the law of deceit is limited
* B.A. 1925, LL.B. 1928, Yale University; LL.D. 1968, University of Lund
(Sweden); LL.D. 1968, University of Chicago; Sterling Professor of Law Emeritus,
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This article is based upon a draft chapter for a forthcoming revision of F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, JR., THE LAw OF TORTS (1956). It follows the organization of and
incorporates some language from Chapter 7 of the original work, which chapter was
written principally by the late Professor Fowler V. Harper. The revision constitutes,
however, a substantially complete reformulation.
1. 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B. 1789).
2. For the earlier point of view, see Leakins v. Clissel, 82 Eng. Rep. 1022 (K.B.
1663); Roswel v. Vaughan, 79 Eng. Rep. 171 (K.B. 1607).
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to misrepresentations which mislead another into an unwise
3
judgment in some business enterprise resulting in financial loss.
It is for this reason that this phase of the law has traditionally
been closely associated with the mores of the commercial world. As
recently as 1938 the following statements were made in the Scope
Note to the chapter on misrepresentation and nondisclosure in
business transactions of the Restatement of Torts:
Courts have recognized that parties to a bargain deal at arm's
length and have made but little effort to care for those whose
acumen and sagacity are inferior to those of their adversaries. In
some particulars the recent tendency of the courts has been to
relax the requirement of vigilance against deception but there is
no tendency to require commercial or financial adversaries to
lay all their 4cards on the table face upward when dealing with
one another.
In recent years, however, there has been increasing social
discomfort with this notion about the relationship between parties to
commercial transactions. There has been a matching awareness that
the common law action of deceit, permeated by the ancient tradition
of caveat emptor, provides only feeble and inadequate protection for
large classes of consumers who are today victimized by fraudulent
and deceitful practices, often pursued by sellers of securities or goods
or real estate and by persons who lend money or furnish credit. 5 The
harmful incidence of these practices upon poor persons is the most
severe and fraught with the most serious consequences, but the poor
are by no means the only victims. Recognition of this problem has
led to a number of statutes which relax and modify some of the
3. Cf. Bohlen, Misrepresentationas Deceit, Negligence or Warranty, 42 HARV. L.
REV. 733, 734-37 (1929) (commercial, financial or other economic matters); Green,
Deceit, 16 VA. L. REV. 749 (1930) (property interests, particularly as affected by sales

and commercial transactions); Weisiger, Bases of Liability for Misrepresentation,24
ILL. L. REV. 866, 869-70 (1930) (commercial transactions).
4. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Scope Notes, at 58 (1938).
5. For a sampling of fairly current critical comment, see Coffey & Welch, Federal
Regulation of Land Sales: Full Disclosure Comes Down to Earth,21 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 5 (1969); Consumer Protection Symposium, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 447 (1974);
Hester, Deceptive Sales Practices and Form Contracts - Does the Consumer Have a
Private Remedy?, 1968 DUKE L.J. 831; Robertson, Consumer Protections Under the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 41 Miss. L.J. 36 (1969); Symposium on Consumer
Protection, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1197 (1966); Symposium - The Developing Law of
Consumer Protection, 10 GONZ. L. REV. 319 (1975); Tydings, FairPlay for Consumers,
6 TRIAL 37 (Feb./Mar. 1970); Developments in the Law - Deceptive Advertising, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1005 (1967); Comment, Condominium Regulation: Beyond Disclosure,
123 U. PA. L. REV. 639 (1975); Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived
Consumers into Effective Programsfor Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 395 (1966).
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common law restrictions on the traditional damage action or on the
equitable remedy of rescission. The pioneer legislation in this field
dealt with the sale of securities. 6 More recent statutes and proposals
deal with consumers, 7 debtors,8 and home-buyers. 9 Moreover,
increasing social concern with these problems has led to some rather
modest changes in the judicial rules governing the action.
It would be out of place in a general torts discussion to treat the
recent legislation in depth. The attempt here will be, rather, to
outline the traditional rules and the judicial developments in them
and then to indicate typical ways in which modern legislation does
or may modify the common law rules. This should afford a basis for
understanding the remedial aspects of the legislation and also for
6. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, §§ 1-26, 48 Stat. 74-92 (1933) (current version at
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970 & Supp. V 1975)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch.
404, §§ 1-211, 48 Stat. 881-909 (1934) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1970 &
Supp. V 1975)); 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1746-54 (2d ed. 1961). For an

exhaustive treatment of civil liabilities under these statutes, see 3 L. Loss, supra at
1623-876; 6 L. Loss, supra at 3780-4007 (Supp. 1969).
7. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1981-1991 (Supp. V 1975), discussed in Yates v. Tindall & Son Pontiac, 531 F.2d 293
(5th Cir. 1975), Duval v. Midwest Motors, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 1381 (D. Neb. 1977), Rider
Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Wright, 415 F. Supp. 258 (M.D. Pa. 1976), Mataya v. Behm Motors,
Inc., 409 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Wis. 1976), Birdwell v. Hartsville Motors, Inc., 404 F. Supp.
625 (M.D. Tenn. 1975); Federal Trade Commission Improvement (Magnuson-Moss
Warranty) Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (Supp. V 1975); Illinois Consumer Fraud
and Deceptive Business Practices Act § 1, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121'/2, § 261 (1973)
(amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121'/2, §§ 261 et seq. (1971)), discussed in Brooks v.
Midas Int'l Corp., 47 Ill. App. 3d 266, 361 N.E.2d 815 (1977), Rice v. Snarlin, Inc., 131
Ill. App. 2d 434, 266 N.E.2d 183 (1970) (statute prior to amendment); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 93A, § 9 (West 1972 & West Supp. 1977-78), discussed in York v. Sullivan, 75
Mass. Adv. Sh. 3379, 338 N.E.2d 341 (1975), Rice, New Private Remedies for
Consumers: The Amendment of Chapter 93A, 54 MASS. L.Q. 307 (1969); New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act § 1, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§56:8-1 et seq. (West 1964 & West Supp.
1977-78), discussed in Neveroski v. Blair, 141 N.J. Super. 365, 358 A.2d 473 (1976);
Consumer Protection Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.86 et seq. (Supp. 1976),
discussed in Fisher v. World-Wide Trophy Outfitters, Ltd., 15 Wash. App. 742, 551 P.2d
1398 (1976); Leete, A Look at the Consumer Warranty Problem - The Federal
Solution, 6 U. TOL. L. REV. 351 (1975); Robertson, Consumer Protection Under the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 41 Miss. L.J. 36 (1969); Tydings, Fair Play for
Consumers, 6 TRIAL 37 (Feb./Mar. 1970).
8. E.g., Truth in Lending Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1677 (1970 & Supp. V
1975); NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (rev. final draft 1969). See Robertson, Consumer
Protection Under the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 41 MIss. L.J. 36 (1969).
9. E.g., Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1970
& Supp. V 1975). For a critical review of this Act's provisions and a brief summary of
existing state laws, see Case & Jester, Securities Regulation of Interstate Land Sales
and Real Estate Development - A Blue Sky Administrator's Viewpoint (pts. 1 & 2), 7
URB. LAW. 215, 385 (1975); Coffey & Welch, Federal Regulation of Land Sales: Full
Disclosure Comes Down to Earth, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 5 (1969). In addition to
civil liability there can be criminal penalties for violation of this Act. See, e.g., United
States v. Goldberg, 527 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976).
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handling problems in that area -

still large -

to which the

legislation does not yet extend. 10
Under the traditional common law rule, the type of conduct
which subjects one to liability for deceit consists of (1) false
representations (2) fraudulently made (3) with the intention of
inducing another to rely thereon. If such misrepresentations (4)
induce reliance and (5) the reliance is justified and (6) causes
damage, the defendant is liable.1 ' The older law also afforded
remedies for misrepresentation by way of rescission (of the
transaction induced thereby), and, as we shall see, the requirements
for rescission were less strict in one or two particulars than those
just listed for damage actions, but beyond that they were pretty
much the same. We shall also see that a defrauded party may in
some situations have other remedies, e.g., by way of defense to an
action for the purchase price of goods sold to him through fraud. But,
in such situations as well, the availability of the remedy is tested
largely by the rules which are applied in a damage action or a suit
for rescission, so that from this point of view also it is convenient to
start with a consideration of those rules.
§ 2.

SCOPE OF LIABILITY IN DECEIT

The scope of the law's protection afforded by the damage action
was originally very narrow. It extended only (1) to the person (or
persons) to whom the defendant made the misrepresentation with
the intent to cause him to act in reliance upon it, and to such person
only (2) for the pecuniary harm, through such reliance in the
transaction or type of transaction in which the maker intended to
influence his conduct.'
Under this rule a person who was not one of those whom the
maker of the statement intended to influence by it could not recover
for loss suffered in reliance on the statement even where such
10. Even in the fields affected by legislation, coverage is sometimes far from
complete. The Federal Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1701-1720 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), for instance, has basic application only to sales of
lots in subdivisions defined as "land which is divided or proposed to be divided into
fifty or more lots ....
15 U.S.C. § 1701(3) (1970).
11. As the Restatement of Torts summarizes it,
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or
law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in
reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss
caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §525

(1977).

1. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 531 (1938).
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reliance and loss were reasonably foreseeable.' For instance, in
Wells v. Cook, 3 defendant sold sheep to the plaintiffs principal
through plaintiff (the principal's brother) as agent, defendant falsely
representing to plaintiff that the sheep were healthy. Plaintiff later
bought his brother's flock relying on the statements made to him as
agent, and the whole flock was lost because of the diseased condition
of the sheep originally sold by defendant. Recovery was denied
because the statement was not "intended to be acted on" by plaintiff
"in a matter affecting himself."' 4 Similarly, a number of cases held
that persons who bought shares of stock on the market could not
take advantage of statements in a prospectus intended to induce the
original purchase of stock from the issuing corporation. 5 Moreover,
defendant would not be liable for a loss suffered from conduct in
reliance on the misrepresentation which was of a different kind from
that which he intended to induce. Thus, one who purchased land in
reliance on false statements concerning title, made in a circular
issued to induce the public to buy bonds secured by a mortgage on
the land, could not sustain an action for deceit based upon those
6
statements.
Even under this rule, defendant need not have the particular
plaintiff in mind or even know of his existence. It is enough that
plaintiff is one of a class whom defendant intends to influence by his
2. This was emphasized by

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

§ 533, Comment b at 77-78

(1938), which read in part:
Probability of repetition to third persons. It is not enough to make the rule
stated in this Section applicable that the maker of the misrepresentation
knows that its recipient may probably, or will to a substantial certainty,
repeat it to a third person for the purpose of influencing his conduct in
transactions with him. The misrepresentation must be made for the purpose
of having it repeated in terms or communicated in substance to the third
person.
This language was applied quite literally in Metric Inv., Inc. v. Patterson, 101 N.J.
Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (1968), where a homeowner made false statements in a credit
application to a contractor for financing home improvements on an installment plan.
The contractor transferred the homeowner's note to plaintiff who was then induced to
discount it by the statements in the credit application, a practice which the court
found prevalent. The court held the plaintiff could not take advantage of these
misrepresentations, quoting the above language. Id. at 309, 244 A.2d at 315.
3. 16 Ohio St. 67, 88 Am. Dec. 436 (1865).
4. Id. at 74, 88 Am. Dec. at 441.
5. See, e.g., Cheney v. Dickinson, 172 F. 109 (7th Cir. 1909); Peek v. Gurney, L.R.
6 H.L. 377 (1873); Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227,
239 (1933). Cf. Hindman v. First Nat'l Bank, 112 F. 931 (6th Cir. 1902), cert. denied,
186 U.S. 483 (1902) (statements in bank certificate); Hunnewell v. Duxbury, 154 Mass.
286, 28 N.E. 267 (1891) (statements in certificate of solvency).
6. Wollenberger v. Hoover, 346 Ill. 511, 179 N.E. 42 (1931); RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 531, Comment c (1938); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531, Comment g
(1977).
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statement.7 Thus, if defendant makes false statements about his
credit to a commercial credit agency, such statements will be taken
as intended to be acted upon at least by the agency's subscribers in
transactions involving defendant's credit.8 And a public circular or
prospectus will be taken as addressed to any member of the public
who accepts the invitation which the circular or prospectus extends.9
Moreover, there came to be recognized exceptions to this rule. If
the statement is embodied "in an article of commerce, a muniment of
title, a negotiable instrument or a similar commercial document,"
the maker is subject to liability to another who relies on the
statement in the course of a business transaction in dealing with the
maker of the statement or with a third person. 10 And where
misrepresentations occur in reports required by statute, the class of
persons who may take advantage of them is defined by the intent or
purpose of the legislature rather than that of the person who makes
the report.11 This latter notion seems destined to assume growing
importance in a time when legislatures are increasingly concerned
with according broad protection to classes of persons frequently
7. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 531, Comment d (1938).
8. Hulsey v. M.C. Kiser Co., 21 Ala. App. 123, 105 So. 913 (1925); Tindle v.
Birkett, 183 N.Y. 267, 76 N.E. 25 (1905); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531,
Comment e (1977).
9. See, e.g., Prescott v. Haughey, 65 F. 653 (C.C.D. Ind. 1895).
10. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 582, Comments (1938); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 532, Comments (1977). See, e.g., National Bank v. Kershaw Oil Mill, 202 F. 90
(4th Cir. 1912) (bill of lading); Baker v. Hallam, 103 Iowa 43, 72 N.W. 419 (1897)
(forged abstract of title); Bruff v. Mali, 36 N.Y. 200, 11 Abb. Pr. 129 (1867) (stock
certificates representing overissue); Stickel v. Atwood, 25 R.I. 456, 56 A. 687 (1903)
(statement on corporate bond).
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §536, Comment d (1977). See also id.
§ 552(3). There may often be room for either a broad or a narrow judicial interpretation
of the scope of the legislative purpose. For example, compare Merchants' Nat'l Bank
v. Armstrong, 65 F. 932 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1895) with Gerner v. Mosher, 58 Neb. 135, 78
N.W. 384 (1899). Both cases dealt with false statements furnished to the Comptroller
of the Currency of the United States under the same section of the National Bank Act,
ch. 106, § 34, 13 Stat. 109 (1864) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 161 (1970)). The
Armstrong court held that these reports were not intended for the protection of a
person who, after relying upon them, accepted shares of stock in the bank as
collateral for a loan. The Gerner court held that the reports were intended, inter alia,
for the protection of persons who bought shares in the bank, saying, "We think the
object is to afford public information to all persons having or contemplating business
transactions into which the condition of the bank enters as a material factor." 58 Neb.
at 146, 78 N.W. at 387.
Compare also Merchants' Nat'l Bank with Warfield v. Clark, 118 Iowa 69, 91
N.W. 833 (1902) (involving state statutory provisions requiring reports by insurance
companies). For a discussion of other state reporting statutes, see Hunnewell v.
Duxbury, 154 Mass. 286, 28 N.E. 267 (1891); Dime Sav. Bank v. Fletcher, 158 Mich.
162, 122 N.W. 540 (1909); Webb v. Rockefeller, 195 Mo. 57, 93 S.W. 772 (1906);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 536, at 107-11 (Tent. Draft
No. 10, 1964).
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victimized by fraud. 12 Thus under the federal securities statutes the
liability for misstatements and omissions in the required registration statement is extended to the ultimate investor and "even to a
buyer in the open market, all without the plaintiffs proving that the
'' 13
misrepresentation was addressed to or intended to influence him.
In addition to legislative expansion of the scope of defendant's
duty in fraud, there has been some judicial tendency, reflected in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, to relax the rigidity of the original
rule. 1 4 These authorities would extend the class of persons who may
take advantage of a fraudulent misrepresentation to include those
who the defendant has reason to expect 5 will act in reliance on the
statement although such persons are beyond the range of his actual
intent. Thus, where a member of an auto theft ring sold a stolen auto
to W whom he knew to be in the business of repairing and selling
autos, with representation of good title, he was held liable to a
purchaser from W who relied on this representation. 16 Adoption of
the Restatement (Second)'s broader test will include cases hereto12. See § 1 at notes 5 to 9 and accompanying text supra.
13. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1731 (2d ed. 1961) (emphasis in original).
See 6 id. at 3850-51 (Supp. 1969); Shulman, Civil Liabilitiesand the Securities Act, 43
YALE L.J. 227, 248-50 (1933). Cf. Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33
(E.D. Pa. 1964) (filing false report, where such report was required by securities
legislation, deemed sufficient to create common law liability for misrepresentation).
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531(h) (1977).
15. "One has reason to expect a result if he has information from which a
reasonable man would conclude that the result will follow or would govern his
conduct upon the assumption that it will do so." Id. Comment d. It is not enough that
there be a foreseeable likelihood which would suffice to make conduct negligent under
prevailing rules of tort liability. There must be "an especial likelihood that it will
reach those persons and will influence their conduct." Id. For a similar distinction
between "reason to know" and "should know," see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 12 (1965).
16. Oppenhuizen v. Wennersten, 2 Mich. App. 288, 139 N.W.2d 765 (1966). Other
earlier cases looking in the same direction include Davis v. Louisville Trust Co., 181 F.
10 (6th Cir. 1910) (false statement given to credit agency by defendant relied upon by
one not a subscriber to agency who procured report through business associate who
was such a subscriber; excellent discussion by Warrington, J.); Southern States Fire &
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cromartie, 181 Ala. 295, 61 So. 907 (1913) (like Wells v. Cook, 16 Ohio
St. 67, 88 Am. Dec. 436 (1865), at note 3 and accompanying text supra, but with
specific reason to think that plaintiff would be purchaser); Highland Motor Transfer
Co. v. Heyburn Bldg. Co., 237 Ky. 337, 35 S.W.2d 521 (1931) (subcontractor's reliance
on fraudulent nondisclosure by landowner to architect whose specifications resulted
in bids which were far lower than was actual cost to subcontractor); Dime Say. Bank
v. Fletcher, 158 Mich. 162, 122 N.W. 540 (1909) (creditor's reliance on information
furnished him by credit agency which, in turn, took information from reports
furnished by defendant to secretary of state pursuant to statute); Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931) (accountant liable for
fraudulent misstatement in balance sheet to creditor of customer for whom balance
sheet prepared). See also Countryside Cas. Co. v. Orr, 523 F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1975)
(subsidiary auto insurance company's reliance upon fraudulent statements in a policy
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fore treated as exceptions to the older narrow rule described in the
17
preceding paragraph.
application to parent company); Nationwide Motorist Ass'n v. Freeman, 405 F.2d 699
(6th Cir. 1969); Schoefield Gear & Pulley Co. v. Schoefield, 71 Conn. 1, 40 A. 1046
(1898) (corporation's reliance upon statements made before incorporation to individuals who formed the corporation); Houston v. Thornton, 122 N.C. 365, 29 S.E. 827 (1898)
(bank directors liable to purchasers of bank stock who relied on probably dishonest,
false published statements as to the condition of the bank).
In some of these cases the reasoning is couched in terms of intent, but the
context makes it reasonably clear that the intent (if that is to be equated with desire
or purpose) is being presumed without inquiry into the specific facts of the case,
"intent" being treated as coterminous with what should have been expected. See, e.g.,
Dime Sav. Bank v. Fletcher, 158 Mich. at 167-68, 122 N.W. at 542: "Representations
made by a person in business to a commercial agency are presumed to have been
made for the purpose of obtaining credit, and we are of opinion that the fact that the
representations in the case at bar were made in the report to the Secretary of State,
and thus indirectly to the commercial agency, is of no consequence." For a perceptive
analysis of the ambiguity lurking in the word "intent," see P. Keeton, The Ambit of a
FraudulentRepresentor's Responsibility, 17 TEx. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1938); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 13, Comment on clause (a) (1934).
The Second Circuit has recently discussed the rule concerning liability to
persons other than those to whom the fraudulent misrepresentation was made in
terms which suggest, albeit inconclusively, adherence to the older version of the rule;
see notes 1 & 2 and accompanying text supra. Peerless Mills Inc. v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 527 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1975). Plaintiffs had lent securities to their son-in-law to
facilitate his purchase of a partnership in defendant brokerage firm, whose partners
had fraudulently misled the applicant as to the firm's financial condition and had
known that the in-laws would be the source of his contribution. Judgment for
defendants was affirmed principally because of lack of reliance, i.e., the fond and
trusting plaintiffs were not in fact misled, as they did not inquire, and were not
informed by the son-in-law, about the firm's supposed condition. In extensive dicta,
however, the court emphasized that "there is no showing that the appellees intended
that [the son-in-law] convey their representations to [the plaintiffs]." 527 F.2d at 451.
The court cited RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964)
as authority for "the need for the defendant to have intended his misrepresentation to
reach and influence the third party," 527 F.2d at 450 n.2, but did not refer to the new
language contained therein which broadens the rule to "intends or has reason to
expect." The court also cited Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170,
174 N.E. 441 (1931), for the same proposition, and even quoted the language in that
opinion which provides for liability for fraud to third persons without regard to
whether disclosure was actually intended by the misrepresenter (because of "notice in
the circumstances" that defendant accountant's client "did not intend to keep. . .to
himself' the fraudulent financial statement which was disclosed to injured creditors
and investors. 255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444). 527 F.2d at 450 n.2. Nevertheless, the
Second Circuit confined its discussion on this issue to the lack of evidence that
defendants intended their misrepresentations to be conveyed to plaintiffs, with no
reference to whether, if'there had been reliance, defendants could have been liable on
the basis of having had "reason to expect" such a disclosure, i.e., whether there was
"notice in the circumstances." The apparent insistence on actual intent for purposes
of § 531 seems to be reinforced by a discussion of the inapplicability of RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 533 (1976), which, while distinguishable, serves to emphasize the
need for more than knowledge by defendant that the misrepresentation "may
probably, or will to a substantial certainty" be repeated to a third person. 527 F.2d at
451.
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Up to the present time the cases have not gone so far as to
extend protection to a plaintiff whose reliance on a fraudulent
statement was merely within the foresight of reasonable men 18 (an
extension which would make the scope of duty in fraud parallel that
in cases where physical damage is caused by negligence). 19 Perhaps
this will be the future course of common law development, but this is
far from clear.
Conversely, a court will occasionally uphold the right of a defendant who is
clearly entitled to prevail under even the new version of the § 531 rule, because there
was no "reason to expect" that a specific misrepresentation made to another would be
repeated to plaintiff, stating instead that defendant "could not have reasonably
foreseen" that the statement would be repeated to plaintiff. See, e.g., Trigo Hnos., Inc.
v. Premium Wholesale Groc., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 1125, 1132 (1976) (however, quoted
statement made in context of an assumed requirement, like that of older version of
§531 rule, that statement be made "with intent to be communicated" to plaintiff).
17. See notes 10 to 13 supra.
18. See note 15 supra. See, e.g., Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527,
547-49 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
At least one court has, however, purported to go the full distance in extending
liability of a merely negligent title abstracter to a remote purchaser of realty on the
express theory that liability for such a "negligent misrepresentation" (not intentional)
"runs to those persons an abstracter could reasonably foresee as relying on the
accuracy of the abstract put into motion . . . which would obviously include grantees
where his . . . grantor or any predecessor in title of the grantor has initiated the
contract for abstracting services...." Williams v. Polgar, 391 Mich. 6, 23, 215 N.W.2d
149, 157 (1974). The court did not discuss whether it could have based its judgment on
narrower grounds, i.e., that the same reasoning which led to the conclusion that
plaintiff was foreseeable could also have led to the conclusion that there was "reason
to expect" the disclosure of the title abstract to realty purchasers, both immediate and
in subsequent transactions, as a class. For an explanation, on somewhat narrower
grounds than those expressed in Williams, of abstracter liability to a remote
purchaser, see Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969). Cf. Rusch Factors,
Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 90-92 (D.R.I. 1968) (dicta) (suggesting desirability of"a
rule of foreseeability"); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 184-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
(declining to define scope of duty on motion to dismiss, but quoting SEC to the effect
that accountant's responsibility is to "investors, creditors and others who may rely on
the financial statements which he certifies").
19. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). See F. HARPER
& F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 20.5 (1956 & Supp. 1968); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §281 (1965).

A reason often given for restricting the scope of duty more narrowly in these
cases than in those when physical injury results is the far wider possibility of
economic harm from a misstatement once released than of physical harm from a
wrongful act - the exposure of defendant in the former case "to a liability in an
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931)
(Cardozo, C.J.). The words were spoken in a discussion of negligent misstatements but
they just as aptly describe the breadth of exposure to liability for fraudulent
misstatements. The question remains, however, whether the conscious liar deserves
protection against wide foreseeable harm from his deception and, if so, to what extent.
See P. Keeton, The Ambit of a Fraudulent Representor's Responsibility, 17 TEx. L.
REV. 1 (1938); Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 39 COLUM. L. REV.
20, 46-52, 52 HARV. L. REV. 372, 398-404, 48 YALE L.J. 390, 416-22 (1939). For the
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For completeness it should be noted that even under the stricter
rule the intent required did not include an intent to harm or cause
loss to plaintiff. A plaintiff is within the scope of the duty not to
deceive where defendant intended him to act upon the misrepresentation whether or not defendant's motives were benign or altruistic.20
proposition, furthermore, that even in the case of negligent misrepresentation no
distinction should be drawn between losses caused by physical injury and those not so
caused, see Lord Devlin's speech in Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd.,
[1964] A.C. 465, 517 (1963).
20. Cf. Boyd's Ex'rs v. Browne, 6 Pa. 310, 316 (1847) (fraudulent credit reference;
dictum that there is no need to prove intent to cheat or defraud); Brown Jenkinson &
Co. v. Percy Dalton (London) Ltd., (1957] 2 Q.B. 621 (C.A.) (apparently bona fide belief
that issuance of false clean bill of lading was in furtherance of commercial
convenience, with no chance in the circumstances of harming recipients); Polhill v.
Walter, 110 Eng. Rep. 43 (K.B. 1832) (untrue representation that defendant was
authorized to accept a bill on behalf of absent friend, made in mistaken belief that
drawee would honor); Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. D. 459, 482 (C.A. 1885)
(misrepresentation concerning purpose for which debentures were sold; dictum that
the object of the lie is wholly immaterial); Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337, 365, 374
(1889) (dictum per Lord Herschell, that "wilfully to tell a falsehood, intending that
another shall be led to act upon it as if it were the truth, may well be termed
fraudulent, whatever the motive which induces it, though it be neither gain to the
person making the assertion nor injury to the person to whom it was made. . . . [I]f
fraud be proved, the motive of the person guilty of it is immaterial."). See also
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

§ 531, Comment b (1938) (omitted from the comments to

§ 531 (1977)).
Apparently, contrary statements - to the effect that there must be an intent to
injure the victim of the misrepresentation in order to sustain an action for deceit abound, but they appear typically in general descriptions of the elements of the cause
of action, in cases where defendant's motive is not determinative (i.e., where plaintiff
does not lose because of his failure to prove a malign motive, but instead either the
motive is clearly malign and defendant loses, as he would under either rule, or the
case turns on other considerations which would control even if defendant's motive
were benign or disinterested). See, e.g., West Virginia Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415
F. Supp. 1107, 1114 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (in applying "traditional elements of common law
fraud" to definition of "fraud" for purposes of U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(b), relating to grounds
for dishonor of a draft or demand for payment under an irrevocable letter of credit, the
court refers to "an element of intentional misrepresentation in order to profit from
another"; decision based, however, on principle unrelated to misrepresenter's motive);
Trigo Hnos., Inc. v. Premium Wholesale Groc., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 1125, 1132 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (dictum that intent "to deprive the plaintiff of a benefit" and "intent to defraud
the plaintiff' is necessary, but holding based on absence of responsibility for
repetition of misrepresentation to plaintiff by third party); Lustine Chevrolet v.
Cadeaux, 19 Md. App. 30, 34, 308 A.2d 747, 750 (1973) ("plaintiff must show that ...
the misrepresentation . . . was made for the purpose of defrauding the person
claiming to be injured thereby"; case turns, however, on causation issue); Abbey v.
Heins, 546 S.W.2d 553, 557 (Mo. App. 1977) (fraud defined as "wilful, malevolent act
directed toward perpetrating a wrong"; defendant clearly reprehensible, loses as he
would under either rule); Reno v. Bull, 226 N.Y. 546, 551, 124 N.E. 144, 145 (1919)
(directors held not liable to purchasers of stock for negligent misrepresentations in
prospectus; dictum that "fraud presupposes a wilful purpose to deprive another of his
legal rights"; this quote is misleading except in the sense that the "legal rights" of the
recipient of a misrepresentation are understood to include the right not to be lied to;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS
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The law here seeks to protect an individual from being tricked by
deceit into making a choice even for his own good.

§ 3.

SCIENTER

The fraud action is traditionally associated with a requirement
that defendant 1 knew the falsity of his statement - often termed a
requirement of scienter. 2 On the other hand the law does in some
cases afford a remedy for merely negligent or even innocent
misrepresentations, in the absence of scienter in any meaningful
sense. Thus, questions are raised as to where the line is to be drawn
between situations in which the requirement obtains and those in
which it does not, and also of what the test of scienter is.
In the common case where defendant knew his statement to be
false, questions concerning the meaning of scienter are not presented. Nor are such questions presented where defendant had no
case turns on lack of scienter, not on motive; if scienter had been present the motive in
the circumstances could hardly have been benign); Beavers v. Lamplighters Realty,
Inc., 556 P.2d 1328, 1331 (Okla. App. 1976) ("intent to deceive and defraud";
defendant, whose purpose was clearly neither benign nor disinterested, would have
lost under either rule); Goerke v. Vojvodich, 67 Wis. 2d 102, 226 N.W.2d 211, 214 (1975)
(statement that misrepresentation "must be made with intent to defraud"; actual
holding turns on lack of intent to mislead); Miles v. Mackle Bros., 73 Wis. 2d 84, 89,
242 N.W.2d 247, 251 (1976) (quotes Goerke, but case turns on failure to allege fraud as
a cause of action). Accordingly, despite the frequency of such loose assertions that
fraud involves an intention to injure plaintiff, they should probably be regarded as
rhetorical excesses, easy to associate with the pejorative overtones of fraud,
particularly where dishonesty and an intent to deceive are assumed to have been
established. Where the latter elements are proven it should not be anticipated that the
victim who suffers damage from justifiable reliance on a misrepresentation will lose
because of failure to prove malign purpose. Of course, if dishonesty need not be
proven, intent to injure is clearly irrelevant. See, e.g., Snyder v. Sperry & Hutchinson
Co., 75 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2463, 333 N.E.2d 421 (1975); Griffin v. Phillips, 542 S.W.2d 432
(Tex. Civ. App. 1976); Alexander Myers & Co. v. Hopke, 14 Wash. App. 354, 541 P.2d
713 (1975).
1. An action for damages for fraud is brought against the person who made the
false statement by the one who acted in reliance on it. The words "defendant" and
"plaintiff' in the text are to be understood in this context. It should be noted, however,
that the maker of the statement may sometimes appear as a plaintiff where the maker
of the false statement brings an action for the purchase price of the goods sold and the
buyer sets up the fraud as a defense to the action. See, e.g., Colorado Kenworth, Inc. v.
Huntley, 537 P.2d 1087 (Colo. App. 1975).
2. Scienter is typically listed as a required element in an action for damages for
fraud. See, e.g., F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 7.3 (1956); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 685-86 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §526 (1977); 37 AM. JUR. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 12 n.10 (1968); 37 C.J.S. Fraud
§3 n.37 (1943).
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belief in the truth of his statement, though he did not positively
know it to be false 3 (as by hypothesis it was); nor in the similar
situation where defendant was recklessly indifferent to the state4
ment's truth or falsity.
Problems are presented, however, where defendant does not
have reasonable grounds to believe in the truth of his statement,
5
even though he does so in fact. In the leading case of Derry v. Peek,
the House of Lords held that such a state of mind was inconsistent
with fraud. In his speech Lord Herschell said: "First, in order to
sustain an action of deceit, there must be proof of fraud, and nothing
short of that will suffice. Secondly, fraud is proved when it is shown
that a false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2)
without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true
or false." 6 Many courts and commentators would accept this as the
point at which negligence begins and fraud has ended.7 But several
things need to be noted in this connection:
-If the case is one where negligence would be an adequate basis
for the remedy sought by plaintiff, or where liability is strict,
nothing should turn on the absence of scienter under modern

3. "A person who suspects his statement is false does not entertain an honest
belief it is true, or is consciously and wickedly indifferent to its truth or falsity."
Navison Shoe Co. v. Lane Shoe Co., 36 F.2d 454, 459 (1st. Cir. 1929). Accord, Luikart v.
Miller, 48 S.W.2d 867 (Mo. 1932); Miller v. Rankin, 136 Mo. App. 426, 117\S.W. 641
(1909); Shackett v. Bickford, 74 N.H. 57, 65 A. 252 (1906); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, § 526, Comment e (1977).
Note that the quotations from Lord Herschell set out in the text at note 6 infra
include this as an instance of scienter.
4. Authorities cited in note 3 supra. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 526, Comment e (1977).
5. 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
6. Id. at 374.
7. See, e.g., Kimber v. Young, 137 F. 744, 748 (8th Cir. 1905); Nash v. Minnesota
Title Ins. & Trust Co., 163 Mass. 574, 577-80, 40 N.E. 1039, 1040 (1895); Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 179-80, 174 N.E. 441, 444-45 (1931).
For comment, see F. HARPER, LAW OF TORTS § 22J (1933); C. MORRIS, TORTS
258-68 (1953); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 107 (4th ed. 1971);
Bohlen, Misrepresentationas Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty, 42 HARV. L. REV. 733
(1929); Carpenter, Responsibility for Intentional, Negligent and Innocent Misrepresentation, 24 ILL. L. REV. 749 (1930); Green, Deceit, 16 VA. L. REV. 749 (1930); Harper &
McNeely, A Synthesis of the Law of Misrepresentation,22 MINN. L. REV. 939 (1938);
P. Keeton, Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent to Deceive, 5 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 583
(1958). But cf. Smith, Liability for Negligent Language, 14 HARV. L. REV. 184 (1900)
(imposition of legal duty to refrain from making erroneous statements, regardless of
honest belief in truth of statement by the defendant); Williston, Liability for Honest
Misrepresentation,24 HARV. L. REV. 415 (1911) (liability for misrepresentation based
on a form of absolute liability such as the form which obtains in the law relating to
warranty rather than a basis of negligence or fraud).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 37

procedures which do not observe the distinctions between the
ancient forms of action.8
-If defendant had no adequate grounds for believing his
statement to be true this may afford a rational inference that he did
not in fact believe it to be true (so that there was scienter). This must
be treated as a permissible inference of fact, however, and not a
presumption of law, or else the distinction between fraud and
negligence will be largely obliterated. If the trier of fact does not
draw the inference under the facts in the case before it - if it finds
that defendant was "dumb but honest" - then the test of scienter is
not met, and a charge to the jury should make this clear. 9
-There is a shading of this test made by many American courts
which tends in its outer reaches to blur the distinction between fraud
and warranty and presents subtleties which call for treatment in a
fuller discussion (which follows).
If defendant was apparently in a position to know the factual
truth or falsity of his statement and if he made the statement as one
of positive fact (as though he knew it), then he will be held
knowingly to have made a false statement if he realized he did not
know the truth of his statement, even though he honestly believed its
truth. 10 A case wherein all these conditions are clearly met falls
fairly within the concept of conscious deception. Defendant has lied
about the extent of his knowledge of the facts in question; he has in
effect represented that he knew a thing to be true when he knew that
he only believed or surmised it to be true. As the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts put it: "The fraud consists in stating that

8. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE §3.11 (2d ed. 1977) (greater
specificity required at common law and under the codes when pleading a charge of
fraud, including knowledge by defendant of falsity of statement).
9. "A consideration of the grounds of belief is no doubt an important aid in
ascertaining whether the belief was really entertained. A man's mere assertion that
he believed the statement he made to be true is not accepted as conclusive proof that
he did so. There may be such an absence of reasonable ground for his belief as, in
spite of his assertion, to carry conviction to the mind that he had not really the belief
which he alleges." Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337, 369 (1889) (Herschell, L.). See also
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 190-92, 174 N.E. 441, 448-49
(1931); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526, Comment d (1977).
10. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Reeves, 121 Ind. 280, 22 N.E. 139 (1889); Knappen v.
Freeman, 47 Minn. 491, 494-95, 50 N.W. 533, 534 (1891); Hadcock v. Osmer, 153 N.Y.
604, 608, 47 N.E. 923, 923-24 (1897); Cabot v. Christie, 42 Vt. 121, 126-27, 1 Am. Rep.
313, 315 (1869); Holland Furnace Co. v. Korth, 43 Wash. 2d 618, 622-23, 262 P.2d 772,
776 (1953); Osborne v. Holt, 92 W. Va. 410, 415-16, 114 S.E. 801, 803 (1922).
If the representation concerned a matter which was apparently not
susceptible of accurate knowledge, this notion is inapplicable. Harris v. Delco Prods.,
Inc., 305 Mass. 362, 365-67, 25 N.E.2d 740, 742-43 (1940).
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the party knows the thing to exist when he does not know it to
exist."11
If this formula is carried beyond this clear case, however, it
tends to obliterate the distinctions between fraud and strict liability.
Thus, in Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffatt, 12 the words just quoted
were immediately followed by these (after a semicolon, in the same
sentence): "and, if he does not know it to exist, he must ordinarily be
deemed to know that he does not." The court proceeded to elaborate:
"Forgetfulness of its existence after a former knowledge, or a mere
belief of its existence, will not warrant or excuse a statement of
actual knowledge."' 13 Taken literally, this phrasing of the test
ignores the possibility that defendant may have had a sincere belief
that he knew something which did not in fact exist, a phenomenon
one meets in everyday life and very nearly parallel to the situation
which the House of Lords found inconsistent with fraud. 14 If the
distinctions between fraud and strict liability or between fraud and
negligence deserve to be preserved - if there is any place for
imposing a liability on the conscious deceiver which is not imposed
on an innocent or merely negligent misrepresenter - then defendant
should escape liability for fraud if he can show that his statement
(including any implied assertion of knowledge) was in full accord
with his sincere belief.' 5 If the circumstances make the sincerity of
that belief doubtful, an inference of scienter may be warranted;16 and
perhaps a finding of sincerity should not be allowed as a mere
conjecture in the absence of positive evidence. 17 But unless the road
to showing sincerity is left open, the Chatham Furnace formula will
turn representations of facts susceptible of knowledge into warranties wearing the guise of fraudulent misstatements.' 8 In a case where
11. Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffatt, 147 Mass. 403, 404, 18 N.E. 168, 169 (1888).
See, similarly, Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 423 F. Supp. 275, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Lee
v. Brodbeck, 196 Neb. 393, 397, 243 N.W.2d 331, 334 (1976).
12. 147 Mass. 403, 18 N.E. 168 (1888).
13. Id. at 404, 18 N.E. at 169 (emphasis supplied). See also Snyder v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co., 75 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2463, 2480-81, 333 N.E.2d 421, 428 (1975).
14. See text accompanying notes 5 & 6 supra.
15. See the excellent analysis in P. Keeton, Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent to
Deceive, 5 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 583 (1958).
16. Cf. note 10 and accompanying text supra (where defendant is in a position to
know the factual truth or falsity of the statement).
17. This is Keeton's position, and it would probably be a sufficient basis for
explaining the holdings of most cases (including Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffatt,
147 Mass. 403, 18 N.E. 168 (1888)). P. Keeton, Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent to
Deceive, 5 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 583, 592-96 (1958).
18. This would occur in very much the same way that a compulsory presumption
of scienter from lack of reasonable grounds to support belief would tend to obliterate
the distinction between fraud and negligence. See Note, Fraud - Negligence Liability for Innocent Misrepresentation,21 MINN. L. REV. 434, 439 (1937).
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policy calls for strict liability this process may lead to a proper
result, but it leads to conceptual confusion which may cause trouble
in other cases where liability should not be imposed on the innocent
representer.

§ 4.

DECEIT, NEGLIGENCE AND LIABILITY WITHOUT FAULT

As Bohlen pointed out in a leading article,1 the three types of
liability for misrepresentation represent instances of the three
general fields of tort law - liability for intended wrongs, liability for
negligent wrongs, and strict liability imposed without fault. The
question then arises whether the application of these variant
liability formulas in this field reflects valid differences between
situations which call for different treatment. It is submitted that by
and large this is the case, though it must be conceded that in some
instances the decisions seem to defy attempts to bring consistency
and clarification to this branch of the law.2 Moreover, changing
times and needs may call for shifts in drawing the line, and
extension of the areas in which liability may be based on negligence
or warranty. But reasons for differences remain.
In the first place, people's reasonable expectations are not the
same in all situations, nor the same with respect to persons standing
in divers relationships toward them. As noted at the outset,' the law
governing misrepresentation is largely business law and reflects the
mores of the market place, though it is being tinged increasingly by
notions once thought paternalistic. When a man has relied to his
loss on another's statements in a business transaction and seeks a
legal remedy, then the law is faced with deciding whether he was
justified as a practical matter in such reliance. To some extent - a
diminishing extent - this will vary inversely with his own selfprotective care.
The traditional view, reflecting the business ethics and mores of
a former generation, which are by no means entirely superseded,
divided situations into four kinds. In arm's length dealings between
open antagonists, people do not even expect honesty in some types of
statements, such as those of pure opinion. Here was an area in
1. Bohlen, Misrepresentationas Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty, 42 HARV. L.
REV. 733, 735-39 (1929).
2. For examples in one jurisdiction, see, e.g., the decisions cited in Note, Deceit
and Negligent Misrepresentationin Maryland, 35 MD. L. REV. 651 (1976).
3. § 1 at notes 3 & 4 supra.
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which the' 4conscious lie was privileged - the area of "trade talk" or
"puffing." This area has shrunk in recent years but has not entirely
disappeared.
There are other situations where honesty will be generally
expected, but not care and certainly not a guaranty.
In still other situations, the relationship of the parties is
generally accepted in the community as carrying obligations on the
part of the one to employ reasonable care to avoid misleading the
other. In such cases, the latter may properly assume that the former
will not make representations which he has no reasonable ground to
believe to be true. These assumptions are justifiable because they
conform to the ethics of business practice. Here the law requires the
parties to make good the tacit assumptions upon which they deal.
Finally, there are situations in which action is commonly taken
in business negotiations in reliance upon the assumed existence of
certain facts. Business proceeds upon the assumption that representations are true. These are usually cases in which the party making
the representations is in a position which gives him exclusive access
to the facts, or the manner of giving the information constitutes such
an assumption of complete knowledge that the psychological effect
upon the other is calculated to divert that self-protective investigation which might otherwise be made. Business would be greatly
hampered, and human nature ignored, were the law not to lend its
sanction to enforce the prevailing assumptions of accuracy thus
made. "[W]ith the acceleration of business generally," says Dean
Green,5 "as well as the standardization of the various types of
transactions, the factors which control judgment demand more and
more certainty and precision in sales and credit transactions ...."
Another consideration which may call for differences in the
formula of liability to be applied is that the effect of imposing it on a
defendant may vary from one situation to another. Where defendant
is a stranger to the transaction (or even a servant or agent of a
participant), he may stand to gain little or nothing from its
consummation so that an award of damages against him must be
met out of his own unaided resources.6 In other cases the remedy
may simply restore the parties to the transaction (e.g., buyer and
seller) to the status quo ante, as by rescission, or prevent one party
from reaping unjust enrichment from the transaction. 7 In the latter
4.
5.
(1930).
6.
7.

See §8 at note 10 infra.
L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 280 (1930); Green, Deceit, 16 VA. L. REV.749, 757
See § 5 at notes 3 & 4 and accompanying text infra.
See § 7 at notes 9 to 17, 20 to 24 and accompanying text infra.
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cases, imposing liability upon an innocent misrepresenter is not as
harsh as where damages against a stranger must come out of his
own pocket.
A quite different kind of consideration also may come into play.
The law has occasionally developed what may be called prophylactic
rules which limit or impede liability in the interest of safeguarding
against some real or supposed evil. Thus the statute of frauds
requires certain kinds of agreements to be in writing in order to be
legally enforceable, and the parol evidence rule excludes evidence
which might otherwise enlarge or restrict liability where preliminary
negotiations have become merged or integrated in a formal contract.
Neither rule will preclude the showing of fraud.8 And if the notion of
fraud is extended beyond conscious deception to include other kinds
of misstatements the policy embodied in these prophylactic rules
might be seriously undermined. A similar set of considerations will
come into play where plaintiff seeks a remedy which is not
ordinarily available to him except on a showing of fraud, e.g., a

8. See Nelson Realty Co. v. Darling Shop of Birmingham, 267 Ala. 301, 309, 101
So. 2d 78, 84-85 (1958); Cobbledick-Kibbe Glass Co. v. Pugh, 161 Cal. App. 2d 123, 127,
326 P.2d 197, 200 (1958); Bloomberg v. Pugh Bros. Co., 45 R.I. 360, 121 A. 430 (1923);
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Presley, 137 Tex. 232, 238, 152 S.W.2d 1105, 1107 (1941);
Mawhinney v. Jensen, 120 Utah 142, 152-53, 232 P.2d 769, 775 (1951); Cabot v.
Christie, 42 Vt. 121, 1 Am. Rep. 313 (1869); 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 573, 580 (1960).
But cf. Apolito v. Johnson, 3 Ariz. App. 232, 236, 413 P.2d 291, 295 (1966) (dictum)
(misrepresentations contradictory to unambiguous express terms of contract disallowed as violative of parol evidence rule); Newmark v. H.&H. Prods. Mfg. Co., 128 Cal.
App. 2d 35, 274 P.2d 702 (1954) (representations which were inconsistent with written
instrument properly excluded). See also P. Keeton, Fraud - -Statementsof Intention,
15 TEX. L. REV. 185, 200-09 (1937); § 10 at notes 19 to 24 and accompanying text infra.
The parol evidence problem may be complicated by a clause specifically
reciting that "no statements or representations of any kind or nature . . . not
contained herein shall be binding" upon the party whose agents made such
statements. Sharkey v. Burlingame Co., 131 Or. 185, 282 P. 546 (1929) (admitting the
parol evidence and citing cases holding both ways). See, e.g., Bloomberg v. Pugh Bros.
Co., 45 R.I. 360, 121 A. 430 (1923); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Presley, 137 Tex. 232, 152
S.W.2d 1105 (1941) (both admitting parol evidence; where fraud initiates the contract,
and the restrictive clause itself falls within such, the entire contract is voidable). See
Hester, Deceptive Sales Practices and Form Contracts- Does the Consumer Have a
Private Remedy?, 1968 DUKE L.J. 831, 836-40.
Such clauses and other integration clauses should not be allowed to close the
door to showing actual fraud. A principal purpose of the parol evidence rule is to
guard writings against too easy fabrication of oral testimony. The rule does this by
drawing a more or less hard and fast line which will exclude honest as well as
fraudulent testimony. Because it does so it can be used as a vehicle for fraud and
oppression - particularly of the legally unsophisticated. And a rule which would
prevent the showing of actual dishonesty would allow the drafter of the instrument to
create a built-in protection for his own fraudulent overreaching. See Sharkey v.
-Burlingame Co., 131 Or. 185, 205-06, 282 P. 546, 552 (1929) (clause having such effect
would be void).
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judgment not dischargeable in bankruptcy,9 body attachment or
execution, or punitive damages. 0 If the policies which protect
defendants against such remedies in actions based on ordinary
negligence or contract are to be served, then the action of fraud (in
which these remedies would be available) should be saved for
conscious deception, and the distinction between fraud on the one
hand and negligence or warranty on the other should be kept
meaningful." Still another occasion for making the distinction is
presented when the defense of contributory negligence is interposed
since this will probably defeat an action based on negligence but not
one for deceit.

§ 5.

LIABILITY BASED ON SCIENTER

The real question here is when is a showing of intentional deceit
required for liability. In all cases where liability may be predicated
on some lesser showing, i.e., negligence or warranty, a showing of
intentional deceit will a fortiori suffice for liability. Judicial
statements about the need for scienter in cases where it is shown
should be carefully weighed with this in mind.' It is only where
liability is denied for want of scienter, but where negligence or a
9. See, e.g., In re Romero, 535 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1976); Abbott v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 516 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1975).
10. See Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 405-06, 179 N.E.2d 497, 499, 223
N.Y.S.2d 488, 491 (1961) (punitive damages allowable where fraud is gross and
involves a high moral culpability). Cf. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d
1276, 1283 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970) (punitive damages not
allowable for violations of § 17a of the Securities Act of 1933); § 15 at note 8 infra.
11. Cf. Brown v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 53 Wash. 2d 142, 332 P.2d 228 (1958)
(where a real estate broker who had been held liable for a misstatement to a purchaser
sought indemnity from his insurer under a policy which covered liability for
negligence but excluded liability for dishonest or fraudulent acts of the insured, the
court properly found it necessary to determine whether the insured's misstatement
was fraudulent in the sense which involves conscious deception).
1. See, e.g., C.W. Denning & Co. v. Suncrest Lumber Co., 51 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.
1931) (withdrawal of fraud issue from jury upheld where verdict gave credit for
shortages in amount of lumber represented); Tremaine Alfalfa Ranch & Milling Co. v.
Carmichael, 32 Ariz. 457, 259 P. 884 (1927) (actual fraud required but found proven).
At common law a plaintiff could recover only if he could establish the
elements of the cause or form of action he had chosen. Under this system a ruling that
scienter was needed to establish an action for deceit would not necessarily mean that
plaintiff was without remedy in some other form of action. See, e.g., Cantwell v.
Harding, 249 Ill. 354, 94 N.E. 488 (1911); Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd.,
[1964] A.C. 465, 484-89 (1963) (Reid, L.) (distinguishing Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas.
337 (1889)).
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warranty-like statement is shown, that such statements represent
2
the actual holding or decision in the case.
Conscious fraud, involving scienter as we have defined it, is
required by the weight of authority where the misrepresentation
induces plaintiff to enter into a transaction to which defendant is a
stranger.' Thus, in Pasley v. Freeman,4 defendant misrepresented
the credit of a third person, Falch, and thereby induced plaintiff to
extend credit to Falch. The same rule is sometimes applied where
defendant is a broker or agent whose misrepresentation brings
plaintiff into business relations with his principal. 5 And in Derry v.
Peek, 6 defendant's statements induced plaintiff to buy shares in the

2. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Redmond, 103 Conn. 237, 130 A. 108 (1925); Warfield v.
Clark, 118 Iowa 69, 91 N.W. 833 (1902); Kountze v. Kennedy, 147 N.Y. 124, 41 N.E. 414
(1895); Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889). See also In re Alodex Corp., 533 F.2d
372 (8th Cir. 1976), concerning which of two state statutes of limitations should apply,

in the absence of a federal statute of limitations, to a federal securities misrepresentation claim under § 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970)
and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R. §240-10b-5
(1975). The two competing limitation periods were Iowa's five-year limitation for
common law fraud, and the two-year period in that state's Blue Sky law. The Eighth
Circuit chose the two-year period, not only because the subject of the Blue Sky law
was the same as that of the federal rule, i.e., securities regulation, but also because the
court concluded that the federal rule resembled the Blue Sky law more than common
law fraud in terms of applicable defenses. It so held because it considered that the
Blue Sky law did not require scienter; that common law fraud in Iowa does require
scienter; and, according to precedent in that circuit, it then thought that scienter was
not required for a Rule 10b-5 action. But see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976), where the Supreme Court, in an opinion rendered one week after the Eighth
Circuit's Alodex decision, ruled that scienter is required for purposes of damage suits
under SEC Rule 10b-5. As to the need for scienter in the case of other remedies under
Rule 10b-5, see 90 HARV. L. REV. 1018 (1977).
3. Vartan Garapedian, Inc. v. Anderson, 92 N.H. 390, 31 A.2d 371 (1943); Pasley
v. Freeman, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B. 1789). See Rosenberg v. Cyrowski, 227 Mich. 508,
512, 198 N.W. 905, 906 (1924) ("But when the person making the representations is not
a party to the transaction, and in no way profits by the act of the party defrauded in
reliance on the representations made by him, he is liable for damage only in case he
knows the representations made by him to be false ..
"). Cf. Bland v. Reed, 261 Cal.
App. 2d 231, 67 Cal. Rptr. 589 (1968) (injured employee unjustified in relying upon
alleged representation of non-lawyer union representative where no confidential
relationship is present). The significance of the Garapediandecision is pointed up by
the fact that New Hampshire is in the vanguard of those states which accept
negligence as a basis of liability for misrepresentation. See § 6 at note 7 infra.
4. 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B. 1789).
5. Kuehl v. Parmenter, 195 Iowa 497, 192 N.W. 429 (1923); Smith v. Badlam, 112
Vt. 143, 22 A.2d 161 (1941); Lasman v. Calhoun, Denny & Ewing, 111 Wash. 467, 191
P. 409 (1920). But cf. § 7 note 28 and text accompanying notes 26 to 28 infra (possible
strict liability for positive and unequivocal statement of fact by person in position to
know the facts).
6. 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
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corporation in which defendant was a director.7 In such cases,
however, defendant is not a stranger to the transaction and indeed
stands to gain directly or indirectly by it to a greater or lesser extent.
It is not surprising therefore that some courts have imposed liability
on such persons even where conscious deception is not shown.8 And
the Federal Securities Acts 9 impose civil liability on a wide group of
persons including officers, directors, accountants and underwriters,1°
for false statements and certain omissions in a registration
statement without requiring scienter. The issuer's liability is strict,
that of other classes of defendants defeasible if certain named
defenses are affirmatively established, among which is that such
person "had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to
believe and did believe" in the truth of the false statement.11
The question whether scienter is required also arises in cases
between buyer and seller where the misrepresenter gained by the
transaction which his misrepresentation induced. Here there is
usually an adequate basis for making even an innocent misrepresenter restore the loss he has caused the other, at least to the extent that
he has gained by the misrepresentation, or for putting both parties
back into the status quo ante. 12 Here the authorities that insist on
actual scienter 13 are believed to be too strict.
7. See also Warfield v. Clark, 118 Iowa 69, 91 N.W. 833 (1902); Nash v.
Minnesota Title Ins. & Trust Co., 163 Mass. 574, 40 N.E. 1039 (1875); Reno v. Bull, 226
N.Y. 546, 124 N.E. 144 (1919).
8. See, e.g., Tischer v. Bardin, 155 Minn. 361, 194 N.W. 3 (1923); Osborne v. Holt,
92 W. Va. 410, 114 S.E. 801 (1922); Angell v. Loomis, 97 Mich. 5, 55 N.W. 1008 (1893)
(strict liability applied in all three cases). Cf. Giddings v. Baker, 80 Tex. 308, 16 S.W.
33 (1891) (liability for negligence). For further treatment of Michigan cases, see § 7 at
note 28 infra.
9. Securities Act of 1933, § 1, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970); the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 1, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1970).
' 10. Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 applies to every person who signed the
registration statement; every director in the issuer at the time the statement was filed;
every such director; every accountant, engineer, or appraiser named therein as having
prepared or certified any part thereof; every underwriter with respect to such security.
The Securities Act of 1933, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970); 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1721-42 (2d ed. 1961).
11. Securities Act of 1933, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970). See also 3 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1724-25 (2d ed. 1961). The quoted words apply to parts of the
registration statement not purporting to be made on the authority of an expert.
Different tests of care apply to parts of the statement made on expert authority. See
Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682-703 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also
§ 6 at notes 33 to 36 infra.
12. See §7 at notes 9 to 11 infra.
13. See, e.g., C.W. Denning & Co. v. Suncrest Lumber Co., 51 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.
1931); Dwyer v. Redmond, 103 Conn. 237, 130 A. 108 (1925); Dunn v. White, 63 Mo. 181
(1876); McGinty v. McGinty, 195 Neb. 281, 286-87, 237 N.W.2d 855, 858 (1976) (dicta).
Contrast Griswold v. Tucker, 216 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) (recovery in action
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When the question is not simply one of liability, however, but
rather one where plaintiff seeks a remedy against which it is the
policy of the law to protect the ordinary debtor, then, in order to get
that remedy plaintiff generally is and should be required to prove
actual fraud with scienter.14 And when liability, e.g., in contract, is
precluded by the operation of prophylactic rules such as the statute
of frauds or the parol evidence rule, then the policy behind the
prophylaxis would sometimes seem to require the same kind of
15
showing.

§ 6.

LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATIONS

Where misrepresentations entail the foreseeability of physical
harm and such harm in fact results, the ordinary rules of negligence
have for some time been applied.1 Courts have been more reluctant,
for breach of warranty under contract of sale where seller represented truck to be of
later make than it actually was; scienter requirement not discussed).
Sometimes a narrow holding can be explained as representing a procedural
point of view toward forms or theories of action which should have no place in
modern procedures (under which any appropriate legal theory should be applied to the
facts pleaded and proved). See, e.g., Cantwell v. Harding, 249 Ill. 354, 94 N.E. 488
(1911).
14. See, e.g., Swanson Petroleum Corp. v. Cumberland, 184 Neb. 323, 167 N.W.2d
391 (1969) (judgment discharged in bankruptcy unless based on actual fraud); Walker
v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961) (punitive damages);
Dezero v. Turner, 112 Vt. 194, 22 A.2d 173 (1941) (presumably to obtain body
attachment); Household Fin. Corp. v. Williams, 66 Wash. 2d 183, 401 P.2d 876 (1965).
15. If the contract, e.g., of sale, is written, any promissory warranty which is not
contained in the writing must meet the obstacle of the parol evidence rule. As we shall
see, a promise may involve fraud if when it is made the promisor has no present
intention of fulfilling it. A promise implies a representation that the one who makes it
now has the intention to fulfill it; if this intention is lacking, then the implied
representation is false. In such a case scienter would always exist; the promisor could
not be innocently ignorant of his own present intentions. In such a case fraud exists
in the fullest sense of the word and the parol evidence rule does not bar its proof.
Misstatements of existing fact may, of course, be innocently made. The
question as to whether the parol evidence rule should bar their proof raises the
additional question whether the policy of that rule should validly extend to
nonpromissory warranties or assertions of fact. A good many authorities do exclude
them. See P. Keeton, Fraud - Statement of Intention, 15 TEX. L. REV. 185, 207 (1937);
9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2439 (3d ed. 1940). Williston, on the other hand, argues
persuasively that the obligation under warranties that are representations of fact is
not a contractual one, so that the parol evidence rule should have no application. 2 A.
SQUILLANTE & J. FONSECA, WILLISTON ON SALES § 15-10 (4th ed. 1974). If Williston is
right, this would go a long way towards justifying decisions which dilute the scienter
formula in actions between parties to the contract wherein other considerations, see
§ 7 at note 18 and accompanying text infra, call for strict liability. See, e.g., Cabot v.
Christie, 42 Vt. 121, 1 Am. Rep. 313 (1869).
1. See, e.g., Freeman v. United States, 509 F.2d 626 (6th Cir. 1975) (air traffic
controller negligently gave wrong information about location and direction to pilot of

1977]

MISREPRESENTATION

however, to impose liability on this basis where a misrepresentation
leads solely to economic loss. 2 The reason for the difference is that
by and large the range of physical harm is more limited. 3 In the field
of economic harm, however, "[i]f liability for negligence exists, a
thoughtless slip or blunder ... may expose [defendants] to a
liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an
'4
indeterminate class."
After Derry v. Peek5 made an action of deceit unavailable for
merely negligent misrepresentations, the English courts for many
years denied recovery in any form of action for economic loss caused
by negligent misstatements. 6 American courts and commentators,
7
however, have been less inhospitable to recovery on this basis.
plane carrying parachutists, who consequently jumped, to their death, over Lake Erie
instead of target airfield; government liable); Jones v. Stanko, 118 Ohio St. 147, 160
N.E. 456 (1928); Clay v. A.J. Crump & Sons Ltd., [1964] 1 Q.B. 533 (C.A. 1963).
2. This parallels a general reluctance to impose liability in negligence for
economic loss which does not result from bodily harm to claimant or from physical
damage to property in which he has a proprietary interest. See, e.g., James,
Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A Pragmatic
Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43 (1972); note 23 infra. Where physical damage is
threatened and caused, however, recovery for consequential economic loss is regularly
allowed. See generally 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 25.6-25.9 (1956
& Supp. 1968).
3. This is commonly stated and, presumably, widely supposed. Consider,
however, the case of Mrs. O'Leary's cow, the Texas City disaster, the case of
thalydomide, or the possible holocaust attendant on a nuclear incident. But even in
these cases of "mass tort" the physical consequences are far narrower than the
indirect economic loss. See, e.g., Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1946).
It is also true, on the other hand, that the economic harm likely to result from
negligence is in some cases finite and easily predictable. See note 23 infra.
4. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174 N.E. 441, 444
(1931) (Cardozo, C.J.). The opinion continues: "[t]he hazards of a business conducted
on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in
the implication of a duty that exposes to these consequences." Id.
5. 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
6. Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., [1951] 2 K.B. 164 (C.A.); Le Lievre and
Dennes v. Gould, [1893] 1 Q.B. 491 (C.A.). See Goodhart, Liability for Negligent
Misstatements, 78 L.Q. REV. 107 (1962); Morrison, Liability in Negligence for False
Statements, 67 L.Q. REV. 466 (1951); Seavey, Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co.:
Negligent Misrepresentationby Accountants, 67 L.Q. REV. 466 (1951). But cf. Nocton
v. Lord Ashburton, [1914] A.C. 932 (fraud not proved, but plaintiff not precluded from
claiming relief on the basis of breach of duty arising from fiduciary elationship).
Liability for economic loss caused by negligence has been recognized since
1963. Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd., [1964] A.C. 465 (1963). See
Stevens, Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller: JudicialCreativity and Doctrinal Possibility,
27 MOD. L. REV. 121 (1964). Compare Hedley Byrne with Mutual Life & Citizens'
Assur. Co. v. Evatt, [1971] A.C. 793 (P.C. 1970) (Austl.).
7. See, e.g., Mulroy v. Wright, 185 Minn. 84, 240 N.W. 116 (1931); Weston v.
Brown, 82 N.H. 157, 131 A. 141 (1925); Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275
(1922); Houston v. Thornton, 122 N.C. 365, 29 S.E. 827 (1898); Brown v. Underwriters
at Lloyd's, 53 Wash. 2d 142, 332 P.2d 228 (1958); Bohlen, Misrepresentationas Deceit,
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Some relationships between the parties are generally deemed to
require care on the part of one of them in ascertaining and
communicating facts to the other. An agent may owe this duty to his
principal, a trustee to his beneficiary, or a professional man to his
client.8 Persons who go into the business of getting information may
come under this duty to their subscribers or customers. 9 And where a
failure to use care in performing the duties incident to such a
relationship results in economic loss to the other party to it through
a misstatement, liability has commonly been imposed on the basis of
negligence. In the case of such liability to the other party, or to
others as described below, the negligence may occur either in
obtaining ° or in communicating" the information.
In the field of physical damage the duty to- use care was also
first recognized and imposed as incident to special relationships those involved in certain callings, e.g., carrier, innkeeper, farrier,
surgeon. Such duty has now for generations been extended beyond
these special relationships to the full range of reasonably foreseeable
harm.1 2 In the field of purely economic loss, on the other hand, the
extension of the duty to use care beyond special relationships has
been sluggish and it is uncertain whether it ever will (or should) be
carried to the full extent that it has been in physical damage cases.
The source of the doubt is the same consideration noted above - the
potentially limitless range of economic harm. 13 And while the
Negligence, or Warranty, 42 HARV. L. REV. 733 (1929); Bohlen, Should Negligent
Misrepresentations be Treated as Negligence or Fraud?, 18 VA. L. REV. 703 (1932);
Carpenter, Responsibility for Intentional,Negligent and Innocent Misrepresentation,
24 ILL. L. REV. 749, 9 ORE. L. REV. 413 (1930); Smith, Liability for Negligent
Language, 14 HARV. L. REV. 184 (1900) (the early leading article).
8. See, e.g., A Symposium on ProfessionalNegligence, 12 VAND. L. REV. 535
(1959) (articles treating liability of medical practitioners, pharmacists, architects and
engineers, teachers, attorneys, abstracters, and professional accountants).
9. This is clearly assumed in all the cases which discuss the liability to third
persons. See, e.g., Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 238-39, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (1922).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552, Comment g (1977).
10. See International Prods. Co. v. Erie R. Co., 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662 (1927);
Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
11. See Slater Trust Co. v. Gardiner, 183 F. 268, 270-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1910). Cf. Nash
v. Minnesota Title Ins. & Trust Co., 163 Mass. 574, 40 N.E. 1039 (1895) (defendant
allowed to testify as to his understanding and intention in regard to the meaning of
his misrepresentation).
12. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 18.1 (1956). The older notion
underlay the argument of defendant's counsel in the landmark case of Vaughan v.
Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837). But in this case the argument was made too
late in the course of legal history to prevail.
13. Indeed, in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E.
441 (1931), the question was not whether negligence should be recognized as a basis of
liability in the field of economic harm, but rather the scope of duty or extent of
liability. This consideration is commonly mentioned when this problem is discussed.
See, e.g., Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 90 (D.R.I. 1968); Rozny v.
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history of tort law has been marked by increasing abandonment of
limitations based on similar considerations - usually without the
fulfillment of the dire predictions - it does not follow that such
considerations are without merit in all situations or at all times. In
the present context they may justify limiting the scope of defendant's duty of care at some point short of its scope in cases of physical
damage.
Even where economic loss alone is involved, however, there has
been a limited extension of the duty of care beyond those who are
privies to a special relationship. Where defendant is in a business or
profession which requires care in furnishing information to those
who employ him, he has been held to owe such duty also towards
those to whom, or on whose specific behalf, 14 he furnishes such
information in the course of business or professional dealings even
where that person is outside the circle of privity. 15 Other courts have
Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 62-63, 250 N.E.2d 656, 661 (1969); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d
395, 401-02 (Iowa 1969); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552, Comment a (1977);
Prosser, Misrepresentationand Third Persons, 19 VAND. L. REV. 231, 246-50 (1966);
Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 20, 48, 52 HARV.
L. REV. 372, 400, 48 YALE L.J. 390, 418 (1939); Comment, Auditors' Responsibility for
Misrepresentation: Inadequate Protection for Users of Financial Statements, 44
WASH.

L.

REV.

139, 160 (1968).

14. See, e.g., Shine v. Nash Abstract & Inv. Co., 217 Ala. 498, 117 So. 47 (1928);
International Prods. Co. v. Erie R. Co., 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662 (1927). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2) (1977).
15. The leading case is Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
Recent examples are Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff,
Yavner & Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972); Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 423 F.
Supp. 275 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968),
noted in 49 B.U. L. REV. 194 (1969), 57 CALIF. L. REV. 281 (1969), 52 MARQ. L. REV. 158
(1968), 53 MINN. L. REV. 1375 (1969); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969);
Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. 1973). Cf.
Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., __
Utah , 529 P.2d 806 (1974) (accountants not
liable to an unlimited and unforeseeable class of equity holders). An unusually
advanced application of the concept appears in Bonhiver v. Graff, Minn. 248 N.W.2d 291, 302-03 (1976), where an insurance company was audited simultaneously by accountants and by examiners from the state insurance commissioner's
office. The accountants showed the examiners uncertified work papers and knew that
the examiners relied on those papers, which, it turned out, negligently failed to
disclose information from which massive despoliation by a controlling stockholder
could have been detected. The accountants were held liable not only to the insurance
commissioner, who of course suffered no loss, but also to the policyholders and
general agents of the company, who incurred losses because of the commissioner's
erroneous conclusion that the company was solvent. Liability was premised on the
theory that the commissioner investigated for the policyholders' and agents' benefit,
as their "representative" or "agent," and that he therefore in effect embodied them for
purposes of the scope of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
In Mutual Life & Citizens' Assur. Co. v. Evatt, [1971] A.C. 793 (P.C. 1970)
(Austl.), a majority of the Privy Council accepted the limitations implied in the text viz. that defendant be in the business or profession of giving the kind of advice
involved. The dissenting judges made a strong case, however, for extending liability
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refused to extend liability for negligence beyond those in privity; 16
still others have done so in effect by manipulating the concepts of
fraud and scienter. 17 And courts that are willing to extend the duty
of care in the way suggested above have sometimes refused to do so
where the information is furnished gratuitously,1 8 justifying refusal
by the analogy of the gift or loan of chattels. 19 But another analogy,

which seems 2° apt, would lead to liability in at least some of these
cases also: "It is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even
though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of
' '21
acting carefully, if he acts at all.

to other situations where the advice or information is given in a business or
professional, rather than a casual or social, context. Id. at 810-13.
16. See, e.g., Texas Tunneling Co. v. Chattanooga, 329 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1964);
Investment Corp. v. Buchman, 208 So. 2d 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), petition for cert.
discharged,216 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1968); Howell v. Betts, 211 Tenn. 134, 362 S.W.2d 924
(1962).
As late as 1967 a commentator was able to say "[N]o appellate court decision,
English or American, has ever held an accountant liable to a third person for
negligent misrepresentation." Comment, Accountants' Liabilities to Third Parties
Under Common Law and Federal Securities Law, 9 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 137,
143 (1967). The same statement was made in Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F.
Supp. 85, 90 (D.R.I. 1968) (imposing such liability - but not an appellate decision).
But an accountant was held liable to a known third party in Ryan v. Kanne, 170
N.W.2d 395, 403 (Iowa 1969) ("It is unnecessary at this time to determine whether the
rule of no liability should be relaxed to extend to all foreseeable persons who may rely
upon the report, but we do hold it should be relaxed as to those who were actually
known to the author as prospective users of the report and take into consideration the
end and aim of the transaction."). See also Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v.
Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972); Coleco Indus., Inc. v.
Berman, 423 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Bonhiver v. Graff,

__

Minn.

-,

248

N.W.2d 291 (1976); Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo.
App. 1973); Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co.,

-

Utah

__,

529 P.2d 806 (1974).

17. See, e.g., Anderson v. Tway, 143 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1944); Watson v. Jones, 41
Fla. 241, 25 So. 678 (1899).
For discussion of the significance of "gross" negligence in New York, see
Comment, Auditors' Responsibility for Misrepresentation:Inadequate Protectionfor
the Users of FinancialStatements, 44 WASH. L. REV. 139, 161-62 (1968).
18. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Cyrowski, 227 Mich. 508, 198 N.W. 905 (1924); Renn v.
Provident Trust Co., 328 Pa. 481, 196 A. 8 (1938). Compare Bonhiver v. Graff,
Minn.

__,

248 N.W.2d 291 (1976).

19. See Nash v. Minnesota Title Ins. & Trust Co., 163 Mass. 574, 579, 40 N.E.
1039, 1040 (1895); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 706 (4th ed. 1971).
20. A sensible distinction is made in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552,
Comments c & d (1977), between information given, on the one hand, in the course of
the defendant's business or profession, which indicates that he has a pecuniary
interest in giving it, even though he receives no consideration for the particular
information, and, on the other hand, information given entirely without consideration
or pecuniary interest - direct or indirect - in the transaction. Rosenberg v.
Cyrowski, 227 Mich. 508, 198 N.W. 905 (1924), seems to be at variance with this
sensible rule.
21. Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 239, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (1922). See also Sult v.
Scandrett, 119 Mont. 570, 178 P.2d 405 (1947) (where railroad kept scales for
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Most courts have balked at extending the duty of care beyond
22
those to whom or on whose specific behalf the statement is made.
But the possibility of limitless liability which may justify circumscribing the scope of duty does not apply with equal force to all
situations. As the Supreme Court of Illinois has recently observed,
the mistake of a surveyor in depicting the boundary of a subdivision
lot is likely to cause economic loss only to one in a line of more or
less remote purchasers so that liability to unknown and presently
unidentifiable plaintiffs would involve an exposure quite as finite as
that in the typical physical damage case.2 3 Liability to a private
purchaser was imposed in this case and a few other decisions
accommodation of shippers, it was liable for expenses incurred by prospective
shippers who acted in reliance upon negligent misstatement that scales were in good
order); International Prods. Co. v. Erie R. Co., 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662 (1927)
(prospective carrier of goods liable to prospective bailor for loss incurred because of
negligent misstatement to him about their location). See also C. MORRIS, TORTS
265-66 (1953).
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Note to Institute § 552, para. 4 at 54-56
(Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965).
23. Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 66, 250 N.E.2d 656, 662 (1969) ("The situation is
not one fraught with such an overwhelming potential liability as to dictate a contrary
result, for the class of persons who might foreseeably use this plat is rather narrowly
limited, if not exclusively so, to those who deal with the surveyed property as
purchasers or lenders. Injury will ordinarily occur only once and to the one person
then owning the lot.").
The Rozny rationale is also used in other negligence contexts, where
misrepresentation is not explicitly involved, but where there is a similarity of
underlying concerns. The same central issue, whether or not a rule would lead to
liability so indeterminate as to appear infinite, i.e., unpredictable for actuarial
purposes, affects other doctrinal choices concerning the limitation of liability for
negligent conduct, e.g., the question of liability for purely economic loss, or sometimes
the delimitation of those to whom there should be liability for physical injury. Where
the anticipation of such an unmanageable result can be shown to be unrealistic, the
modern tendency is to extend liability, cautiously. See, e.g., Craig, Negligent
Misstatements, Negligent Acts and Economic Loss, 92 L.Q. REV. 213 (1976); James,
Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A Pragmatic
Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43 (1972); Harvey, Economic Losses and Negligence, 50
CAN. BAR REV. 580 (1972); and a series of three English cases which illustrates the
interplay among these concepts: Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd., [1964]
A.C. 465 (1963); Dutton v. Bognor Regis Urban Dist. Council, [1972] 1 Q.B. 373 (C.A.
1971); and Anns v. London Borough of Merton, [1977] A.C. __,
2 All E.R. 492.
Hedley Byrne dealt with the prototypical subject of a misrepresentation - a
credit reference. In contrast to the situation in Pasley v. Freeman, 100 Eng. Rep. 450
(K.B. 1789), cf. § 1 at note 1 supra, the misrepresentation here was allegedly only
negligent. Liability was denied on the ground that in the particular circumstances
defendant was considered to have had only a duty of honesty, but the House of Lords
stated that in other circumstances there could in principle be liability for such a
misrepresentation negligently made. The discussions of the Law Lords assumed that
the claim was for economic damages resulting from negligent words, and their
speeches generally considered what, if any, the difference in liability should be
between negligent words and negligent acts, and between purely economic damages
and those flowing from physical injuries compensable to claimant.
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involve similar rulings. 24 Moreover, where defendant's purpose is to
influence action on the part of a particular group of persons, the fact
that a member of the group who does so act is not known by name to
Hedley Byrne was then extensively discussed and relied upon in Dutton,
which involved a claim against a municipality for injuries to a building resulting in
part from a negligent official inspection approval of the foundations, before they were
covered up. Lord Denning, M.R., seemed to emphasize the misrepresentation aspect of
the negligence, i.e., that the tort lay in the negligently untrue communication (of
approval) by defendant's employee to the building contractor rather than in the
negligently performed inspection and evaluation. Indeed, Lord Denning treated this
case, as he treated Hedley Byrne, as involving the duty of care of "a professional man
who gives advice to others." And he surmounted the objection that plaintiff, a remote
purchaser who neither received nor was aware of this "advice," had not relied on it,
by distinguishing between categories of professional men: Those who advise on
financial and similar matters, such as bankers, lawyers or accountants, whose duty is
owed only to those who rely on the adviser, with his knowledge that they are doing so,
and suffer financial loss thereby, and those who give "advice" as to the safety of
buildings, machinery or materials, whose duty is to all who may suffer injury "in case
• . . [the] advice is bad."
In Anns, the House of Lords upheld for the first time the liability of public
bodies to remote purchasers in case of negligence relating to the inspection of building
foundations. While explicitly describing its action as the upholding of the Dutton
principle, it did not refer at all to Hedley Byrne or to the notion of "advice." The issue
was treated as liability for physical damages resulting from negligent conduct (the
exercise of the Council's powers of inspection), not as liability for negligent
misrepresentation. The principal objection discussed and overcome was simply a
question of defendant's immunity in respect to discretionary functions. Yet the
reported explanation by Lord Wilberforce of the scope of duty in Anns echoes that
given in Rozny, even though it does not cite it: "A right of action could only be
conferred on an owner or occupier who was such when the damage occurred. That
disposed of the possible objection that an endless, indeterminate class of potential
plaintiffs might be called into existence."
For other examples of how negligence in an inspection report may be viewed
as either negligent misrepresentation or as negligence in the performance of the
inspection, compare Clay v. A.J. Crump & Sons, [1964] 1 Q.B. 533 (C.A. 1963) with
Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 Ill. 2d 69,199 N.E.2d 769 (1964). A similar choice
of perspective could be made in some of the most classic negligent misrepresentation
cases. The actor could be considered as negligent in the performance of a professional
task rather than in his report of it. Two examples are Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y.
236, 155 N.E. 275 (1922) (negligence in weighing rather than in communicating) and
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931) (tortious
auditing, rather than certification). See also note 10 supra. Accordingly, it is entirely
plausible that the notion of scope of duty for purposes of the law of negligent
misrepresentation should evolve in parallel with similar and related developments in
negligence law in general.
24. Walnut Creek Aggregates Co. v. Testing Eng'rs, Inc., 248 Cal. App. 2d 690, 56
Cal. Rptr. 700 (1967); M. Miller Co. v. Central Contra Costa Sanitary Dist., 198 Cal.
App. 2d 305, 18 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1961). Accord, Granberg v. Turnham, 166 Cal. App. 2d
390, 333 P.2d 423 (1958) (real estate broker liable to seller for misrepresentation to
purchasers that property was located in commercial zone, resulting in rescission of
sale); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.E.2d 395 (Iowa 1969) (accountants liable to party who
they knew intended to rely upon accounting statement); Williams v. Polgar, 391 Mich.
6, 215 N.W.2d 149 (1974) (title abstractors liable to land purchasers not in privity who
relied on abstract); Mulroy v. Wright, 185 Minn. 84, 240 N.W. 116 (1931) (city clerk
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defendant should not shield him from liability for negligence. 25 The
Restatement (Second) contains a rule which would accommodate
these decisions 26 and this seems desirable.
On the whole, as indicated above, courts have provided a remedy
for negligent misrepresentation principally against those who advise
in an essentially non-adversarial capacity. 27 As against sellers and
other presumed antagonists, on the other hand, the tendency of most
courts has instead been either to rely on deceit with the requirement
of scienter, however expanded, or to shift (by analogy to restitution
or warranty) to strict liability, 28 although there have been a few
29
exceptions.
The legislature may of course create duties of wider scope than
the courts have been willing to impose. Some statutes of long
3
standing have been held to do so, as in the case of notaries public, 0
32
31
recording clerks, and food inspectors. More recently, the Federal
Securities Acts have imposed liability on a wide circle of defendants
in favor of a wide circle of plaintiffs (any purchaser of a security) for
misstatements or omissions in the registration statement required to
be filed before securities may be issued. Plaintiff need not prove
scienter or even negligence but defendants (other than the issuer)
liable to purchaser of property for false certificate issued to abstracter employed by
seller showing no special assessments against realty purchased); Tartera v. Palumbo,
224 Tenn. 262, 453 S.W.2d 780 (1970) (liability of surveyor to seller of property for
inaccurate plat; purchaser of property in privity with defendant).
25. Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix Nat'l Bank, 253 N.Y. 369, 171 N.E. 574 (1930);
Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd., [1964] A.C. 465 (1963); Prosser,
Misrepresentationand Third Persons, 19 VAND. L. REV. 231, 243-45 (1966). Cf. Hardy
v. Carmichael, 207 Cal. App. 2d 218, 24 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1962) (liability of termite
inspector to purchasers of house, though vendor employed inspector, who made his
report to a bank with knowledge that property was being sold).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §552, Comment h & Illustrations 4-11
(1977). See also id. Illustration 12 in light of cases cited in note 24 supra.
27. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS 545-46 (1956); Hill, Damagesfor
Innocent Misrepresentation,73 COLUM. L. REV. 679, 685-88 (1973). See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 552 & 552C (1977).
28. See § 7 infra.
29. See, e.g., Haynes v. Cumberland Builders, Inc., 546 S.W.2d 228, 232 (Tenn.
252 N.W.2d 252
App. 1976); General Ins. Co. of America v. Lebowsky, - Minn. __,
(1977) (semble). For a similar result construing statutory definition of deceit to include
negligent misrepresentation, see Clar v. Board of Trade, 164 Cal. App. 2d 636, 644-45,
331 P.2d 89, 94-95 (1958).
30. See, e.g., Anderson v. Arohsohn, 181 Cal. 294, 184 P. 12 (1919); Barnard v.
Schuler, 100 Minn. 289, 110 N.W. 966 (1907). Contra, New England Bond & Mortgage
Co. v. Brock, 270 Mass. 107, 169 N.E. 803 (1930).
31. Cole v. Vincent, 229 App. Div. 520, 242 N.Y.S. 644 (1930). Cf. Mulroy v.
Wright, 185 Minn. 84, 240 N.W. 116 (1931) (liability of clerk without reference to
statute).
32. Nickerson v. Thompson, 33 Me. 433 (1851); Pearson v. Purkett, 32 Mass. (15
Pick.) 264 (1834).
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may escape liability by proving due diligence. Ultimate liability
turns on negligence but with the burden of proof inverted. 33 An early
case 34 under this statute held auditors to "surprisingly low
accounting standards" of care35 but the recent trend both within the
profession and in the courts is to impose a substantially higher
36
standard.
As negligence becomes an increasingly recognized basis of
liability for misrepresentation the question whether contributory
negligence is or should be a defense will become increasingly
important. The decisions to date are unanimous in recognizing the
defense 37 and this accords with the view of commentators 38 and the
American Law Institute. 39 To the extent that the defense represents
valid policy at all, its justification in the field of business
33. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970). For treatment of liabilities under

the Securities Acts, see 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1623-1876 (2d ed. 1961); 6
id. at 3820-4003 (Supp. 1969); sources cited in note 36 infra.
34. Shonts v. Hirliman, 28 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Cal. 1939), noted in 38 MICH. L. REV.
1103 (1940).
35. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1733 (2d ed. 1961).
36. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). For
commentary on this decision, see, for example, Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the
Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case, 55 VA. L. REV. 1, 199 (1969); Heller,
Weiss, Israels & Schwartz, BarChris: A Dialogue on a Bad Case Making Hard Law,
57 GEO. L.J. 221 (1968); Jordan, BarChris and the RegistrationProcess, 22 Sw. L.J.
790 (1968); Latty, ProspectusLiability - The BarChris Case, 1970 J. Bus. LAW 65, 68
COLUM. L. REV. 1411 (1968), 1969 DUKE L.J. 1191, 82 HARV. L. REV. 908 (1969), 43
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1030 (1968), 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 293 (1969), 21 STAN. L. REV. 171 (1968),
47 TEX. L. REV. 162 (1968), 117 U. PA. L. REV. 735 (1969).
37. See, e.g., Texas Tunneling Co. v. Chattanooga, 204 F. Supp. 821, 835-36 (E.D.
Tenn. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 329 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1964) (but contributory
negligence not found); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969) (issue held
properly for jury in upholding plaintiffs verdict); Vartan Garapedian, Inc. v.
Anderson, 92 N.H. 390, 31 A.2d 371 (1943) (plaintiffs contributory negligence as
matter of law an alternative basis for decision); Maxwell Ice Co. v. Brackett, Shaw &
Lunt Co., 80 N.H. 236, 116 A. 34 (1921) (semble); Gould v. Flato, 170 Misc. 378, 10
N.Y.S.2d 361 (1938) (contributory negligence found as alternative ground for denying
recovery).
38. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 716 (4th ed. 1971);
Bohlen, Misrepresentationsas Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty,42 HARV. L. REV. 733,
739 (1929). But cf. Bohlen, Should Negligent Misrepresentation Be Treated as
Negligence or Fraud?, 18 VA. L. REV. 703 (1932) (contending that a number of the
rules which determine contributory negligence are unduly restrictive of the right to
recover); Green, Deceit, 16 VA. L. REV. 749, 758-59 (1930) (suggesting doubt as to
advisability of applying in this field the "negligence network of legal theory"
developed in accidental personal injury cases).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552A (1977). The Restatement hedges as
to whether comparative negligence, which has now supplanted contributory
negligence in a majority of American jurisdictions (at least thirty states as of 1977),
should apply to pecuniary harm from negligent misrepresentation in jurisdictions
where it applies to physical harm. Id. Comment b. In principle comparative
negligence would appear more fair in all contexts than the winner-take-all rule of
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transactions is at least as strong as in the field of accidental
physical injury. It is doubtful, however, whether ordinary contributory negligence has a proper place in legislation concerned with
mass consumer protection even where defendant's negligence is
made an ingredient of liability. The very need for such protection
reflects in part the inadequacy of self-protective care. Section 11 of
the Securities Act of 1933, for example, expressly makes it a defense
that plaintiff knew of the untruth or omission in the registration at
the time he acquired his security, 40 but presumably makes no place
for ordinary contributory negligence.

§ 7.

LIABILITY FOR INNOCENT MISREPRESENTATIONS

Strict liability has often been imposed by the law of torts1 and as

already noted this has been true in the field of misrepresentation
resulting in economic loss.2 The procedural vehicles by which such
liability has traditionally been imposed are the equity suit for
rescission, 3 rescission at law, 4 the action for breach of warranty, 5 the
action for fraud and deceit, 6 and the doctrine of estoppel. 7 Innocent
misrepresentation may also be a ground of defense s or counterclaim.
Each of these procedural vehicles had limitations which were
arbitrary in some situations, and each was also the vehicle for
contributory negligence. There may, however, be statutory problems under comparative negligence statutes which appear to be limited by their terms to the abolition of
contributory negligence as a bar in actions resulting in death or in injury to person or
property, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. §663-31 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE §6-801 (Cum.
Supp. 1977); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West 1959); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§604.01 (West 1959); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §507:7-a (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§2A:15-5.1 (West 1952); N.D. CENT. CODE §9-10-07 (1975); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470
(1975); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 1 (Vernon 1971); UTAH CODE ANN.
§78-27-37 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §1036 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.22.010 (1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1966); Wyo. STAT. § 1-7.2 (1957).
40. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1971).
1. See, e.g., F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS ch. 14 & § 28.15 (1956 &
Supp. 1968).
2. Section 4 at note 7 and accompanying text supra.
3. See § 15 at notes 35 to 47 and accompanying text infra.
4. See § 15 at notes 48 to 54 and accompanying text infra.
5. Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 HARV. L. REV. 415,
417-23 (1911).
6. This has been done either by manipulation of the scienter formula in the way
described in § 3 at notes 11 to 15 supra, or by erecting a presumption that defendant
must have known those facts which it was his duty to know. Williston, Liability for
Honest Misrepresentation,24 HARV. L. REV. 415, 427-28 (1911).
7. Id. at 423-27.
8. See § 15 at notes 62 to 68 infra.
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liability in cases of conscious deception. The whole made a confusing
patchwork.
Sense and order can best be made out of this confusing mass of
precedents if attention is focused on the kinds of considerations
which may call for the imposition of strict liability rather than on
forms of action or legal theories of liability.
Perhaps the clearest case is one where the representer stands to
gain by his misrepresentation at the expense of the other party to
the transaction induced by the misrepresentation. This is the kind of
situation for which rescission, either in equity or at law, is often an
appropriate remedy. Where it is, it simply unravels the transaction,
so to speak, and puts each party in the position he held before the
transaction took place. Where this remedy is sought courts generally
are willing to grant it on the basis of innocent, as well as culpable,
misstatements; 9 while the innocent misrepresenter may not deserve
a penalty he should not be allowed to benefit by his false statement
at his innocent victim's expense. 10 There are situations, however,
where rescission is impossible (as where the victim is unable to
return what he has received from the transaction) or undesirable (as
where a purchaser has made improvements on land he has bought,
or simply wants to keep it). In such situations the award of damages
without rescission may have substantially the same effect of simply
preventing the misrepresenter's unjust enrichment. If, for example,
the agreed price of land is expressly or impliedly computed on the
basis of acreage and the vendor has innocently overstated the
number of acres, damages measured by a suitable abatement of the
purchase price will do justice between the parties and let the
purchaser keep the land. It is submitted that the victim of innocent
misrepresentation in the circumstances described in this paragraph
should have a remedy in all cases (subject to other conditions of
liability) and that, where rescission is feasible, he should have his
choice whether to rescind or to keep what he has received and take
damages measured by the unjust enrichment.
The traditional vehicles for a damage remedy have been an
action based on warranty and an action for fraud and deceit, and
each has limitations which may bar its availability or impair its
suitability in some situations where damages are appropriate as a
9. Fields v. Haupert, 213 Or. 179, 323 P.2d 332 (1958) (rescission in equity).
10. "[T]he defendant obtained what the false representations caused the plaintiff
to lose. . . . The false statement of fact was an agency whereby the property of the
plaintiff was transferred to defendant. The law would be justly subject to reproach if it
afforded no redress in such a case." Aldrich v. Scribner, 154 Mich. 23, 28, 117 N.W.
581, 583 (1908). See also P. Keeton, Actionable Misrepresentation:Legal Fault as a
Requirement, 2 OKLA. L. REV. 56 (1949).
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substitute for or an alternative to rescission. The concept of
warranty has traditionally been limited to sales of tangible chattels
and has not been extended to sales of services, securities, or land; 1
and limited also to persons in privity of contract where the
transaction is one to which a warranty may attach. 1 2 The proof of a
warranty may be excluded by the parol evidence rule. 13 And the
fraud action is precluded by the requirement of scienter 14 unless that
is emasculated by some such formula as the one in the Chatham
Furnace Co. case.' 5 Moreover, the measure of damages associated
with the fraud action will sometimes exceed the amount by which
the misrepresenter has been enriched. 6 What is needed is the
recognition that the damage remedy should be available without the
baggage of older forms and theories of recovery wherever its effect
will be to prevent unjust enrichment, 7 except where such a result
11. Securities: E.g., Henderson v. Plymouth Oil Co., 13 F.2d 932 (W.D. Pa. 1926);
Goodwyn v. Folds, 30 Ga. App. 204,117 S.E. 335 (1923); Burwash v. Ballou, 230 Ill. 34,
82 N.E. 355 (1907) (only warranty implied is that stock of corporation is genuine).
Land: see C. MORRIS, TORTS 259-60 (1953).
The notion of warranty has, however, been extended to an agent's statements
that he has authority to do a certain thing, or his conduct implying that he has such
authority. Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation,24 HARV. L. REV. 415,
422-23 (1911).
As between buyer and seller of tangible property, many courts have had little
difficulty in awarding damages for innocent misrepresentations of fact. See, e.g.,
Maurice v. Chaffin, 219 Ark. 273, 241 S.W.2d 257 (1951); Pelette v. Mann Auto Co., 116
Kan. 16, 225 P. 1067 (1924); New England Foundation Co. v. Elliott & Watrous, Inc.,
306 Mass. 177, 27 N.E.2d 756 (1940); Griswold v. Tucker, 216 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1948). Contra, Dwyer v. Redmond, 103 Conn. 237, 130 A. 108 (1925).
12. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS § 28.16 (1956 & Supp. 1968).
13. Cummings v. Case, 52 N.J.L. 77, 18 A. 972 (1889) (dicta) (parol evidence held
admissible in this case to show the instrument was void); Cabot v. Christie, 42 Vt. 121,
1 Am. Rep. 313 (1869); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2434 (3d ed. 1940); 2 A. SQUILLANTE
& J. FONSECA, WILLISTON ON SALES § 15-10 (4th ed. 1974); Keeton, Fraud Statements of Intention, 15 TEX. L. REV. 185, 204-09 (1937).
14. Sections 3 & 5 supra.
15. Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffatt, 147 Mass. 403, 18 N.E. 168 (1888). For a
recent example of the emasculation of the scienter requirement, see Bostic v. Amoco
Oil Co., 553 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1977).
16. This will often be true where defendant is an agent or broker rather than a
principal in the transaction. See, e.g., Krause v. Cook, 144 Mich. 365, 108 N.W. 81
(1908); Tischer v. Bardin, 155 Minn. 361, 194 N.W. 3 (1923).
It may also be true when both parties are principals (as buyer and seller). See,
e.g., Aldrich v. Scribner, 154 Mich. 23, 30-31, 117 N.W. 581, 584 (1908) (under loss of
bargain rule). Cf. Seeley v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17
(1965) (consequential damage allowed against manufacturer on theory of breach of
warranty).
17. Cf. 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 613 (1960) (an admirable analysis defending the
advantages of a "variety of remedies, enforceable by a variety of processes").
The approach of the Michigan court in Holcomb v. Noble, 69 Mich. 396, 37
N.W. 497 (1888) and Aldrich v. Scribner, 154 Mich. 23, 117 N.W. 581 (1908) comes close
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would subvert vital policies embodied in the parol evidence rule. And
since innocent false statements could scarcely include false statements of one's own intentions, or promissory fraud, serious collisions
with the policy of the parol evidence rule will occur only if that
8
policy is properly extended to non-promissory statements.'
There is a considerable body of decisions allowing damages in
the type of case discussed above without insistence on older
limitations which have vexed the remedy. 19 Thus a manufacturer's

to this. But this court, having chosen the action for deceit as the vehicle for liability,
saw no way to escape from rigidly applying the conventional measure of damages in
that action (plaintiffs loss rather than by the amount of defendant's unjust
enrichment). See Aldrich v. Scribner, 154 Mich. 23, 30-31, 117 N.W. 581, 584 (1908).
18. Non-promissory false statements of fact which induce a party to enter into a
contract are not excluded by the parol evidence rule if they involve conscious fraud,

but many authorities hold that innocent misstatements of fact would be actionable
only as warranties and therefore come within the parol evidence rule. P. Keeton,
Fraud - Statements of Intention, 15 TEx. L. REV. 185, 207 (1937). See also J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2439 (3d ed. 1940); Hill, Breach of Contract as a Tort, 74
COLUM. L. REV. 40 (1974); Hill, Damages for Innocent Mispresentation,73 COLUM. L.
REV. 679, 733-37 (1973). Williston, while recognizing this, argues forcefully that the
obligation under warranties that are representations of fact is non-contractual; hence
that the parol evidence rule should have no application to them. 2 A. SQUILLANTE & J.
FONSECA, WILLISTON ON SALES § 15-10 (4th ed. 1974). This view has some judicial
support. See, e.g., Adams v. Gillig, 199 N.Y. 314, 320, 92 N.E. 670, 672 (1910) (as the
statement of present intention "was not promissory and contractural in its nature,
"). Huddleston
there is nothing in the rules of evidence to prevent oral proof of [it] ..
v. Lee, 39 Tenn. App. 465, 284 S.W.2d 705 (1955). See also § 5 at note 15 supra (parol
evidence rule may not apply to the obligation under warranties that are not
representations of fact).
It should also be noted that there are many situations to which the parol
evidence rule does not apply, e.g., those where the memorandum does not purport to be
complete, those where the question arises between parties not in privity of contract (as
in the cases cited in note 19 infra).
One argument for ignoring the prophylactic rules of contract law in the case
of a tort remedy for innocent misrepresentation has been based on the assumed
difference between the out-of-pocket measure of damages for this tort, as in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C (1977) (which would even exclude recovery
of consequential damages), and the benefit-of-the-bargain rule (plus consequential
damages) in contract, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-714. This distinction has been forcefully
criticized as frequently illusory, on the ground that in the normal sale of a
standardized mass-produced product, "the disappointed buyer is not likely to prove
convincingly that the value of the property as represented by the concededly honest
seller was substantially in excess of the purchase price." Hill, Breach of Contractas a
Tort, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 40, 46 (1974). The Restatement concedes that where "as a
practical matter, the amount recoverable under this Section is substantially the same
as the amount recoverable for breach of warranty, the argument against recognition
of defenses traditional to the warranty action loses much of its force." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §552C, Comment b (1977).
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C (1977). But cf. Hill, Damagesfor
Innocent Misrepresentation,73 COLUM. L. REV. 679 (1973) (innocent, non-negligent
promissory representations should be governed by contract law; non-promissory
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misstatements in advertising through mass communications media 2 °
or on labels on a product 21 have been held a proper basis for liability
to remote purchasers who have relied on such statements to their
economic loss, thereby either dispensing with or greatly expanding
traditional notions of privity. 22 And liability has been found in
by warranty law as in the case
situations not traditionally covered
24
23
of sales of securities or land.

Where the innocent misrepresenter does not benefit from the
transaction or where his benefit is only by way of commission or the
like so that it does not correspond to the victim's loss, the
justification for imposing liability upon him described above is
lacking. 25 And the same is true in all cases where plaintiffs loss
representations should not be basis of liability in damages) and Hill, Breach of
Contract as a Tort, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 40 (1974) (addendum).
20. See, e.g., Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181
N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962); Inglas v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d
132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240
(1966); Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence,66 COLUM. L. REV.
917 (1966); 41 ST. J.L. REV. 401 (1967); 114 U. PA. L. REV. 539 (1966).
21. See, e.g., Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181
N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).
22. Cf. Seeley v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17
(1965) (manufacturer liable to purchaser); Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44
N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) (manufacturer liable to purchaser); Price v. Gatlin, 241
Or. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965) (wholesaler not liable to non-privity purchaser for
economic loss); Note, Privity Eliminated as a Requirement in Loss-of-Bargain
Products Liability Cases - The Effects of Santor, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 715 (1965)
(discussing manufacturer's liability to purchaser); Comment, Seeley v. White Motor
Co.: Retrenchment in Californiaon Strict Products Liability,52 VA. L. REV. 509 (1966)
(same). See also Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887, 908-11 (1967)
(addressing the broader problem of strict liability, without limitation by privity, for
defective products that cause economic loss only).
23. Iler v. Jennings, 87 S.C. 87, 68 S.E. 1041 (1910); Osborne v. Holt, 92 W. Va.
410, 114 S.E. 801 (1922). Cf. Peterson v. Schaberg, 116 Neb. 346, 217 N.W. 586 (1928)
(representations about makers of notes).
24. The Michigan cases clearly recognize this without manipulating the scienter
formula. See, e.g., Aldrich v. Scribner, 154 Mich. 23, 117 N.W. 581 (1908); Holcomb v.
Noble, 69 Mich. 396, 37 N.W. 497 (1888). See also Ladner v. Balsley, 103 Iowa 674, 72
N.W. 787 (1897); Forsberg v. Baker, 211 Minn. 59, 300 N.W. 371 (1941).
The same result in effect is more often reached through manipulation of
scienter. Clark v. Haggard, 141 Conn. 668, 109 A.2d 358 (1954) (sale of land); Becker v.
McKinnie, 106 Kan. 426, 186 P. 496 (1920) (sale of water rights); Chatham Furnace Co.
v. Moffatt, 147 Mass. 403, 18 N.E. 168 (1888) (sale of leasehold); Newberg v. Chicago,
B. & Q. R.R., 120 Neb. 171, 231 N.W. 766 (1930) (sale of land; rescission or damages
decreed alternatively); Osborne v. Holt, 92 W. Va. 410, 114 S.E. 801 (1922) (sale of
securities; representer had duty to know whereof he spoke); Palmer v. Goldberg, 128
Wis. 103, 107 N.W. 478 (1906) (representations about maker of note).
25. "This principle [strict liability for innocent misrepresentations], which is
altogether just in its application to cases where the loss of the plaintiff has inured to
the profit of the defendant, would be most unjust if applied to cases where the
defendant has obtained no such profit." Aldrich v. Scribner, 154 Mich. 23, 28, 117
N.W. 581, 583 (1908).
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exceeds defendant's gain, to the extent that it does so. Such liability
-

or liability to such extent -

must therefore be justified on some

other ground.
A possible basis is the strong psychological effect in inducing
reliance on positive and unequivocal statements of fact made by a
person in a position -

or apparently in a position -

to know the

facts. 26 This effect is accentuated in the common situation by the
plaintiffs relative lack of access to the facts. 27 It may be that the
risk of causing loss by inaccuracy in statements made in this form is
so great as to justify a rule that one makes them at his peril. But this
seems harsh if it is applied to one who has made what is by
hypothesis an honest and a non-negligent statement unless he gets
some benefit from making it. This consideration may, however,
justify saddling the one who made the misstatement with his equally
innocent victim's loss from it, wherever the former benefits from
making the statement even where the loss exceeds the benefit. 28
26. Harper & McNeeley, A Synthesis of the Law of Misrepresentation,22 MINN.
L. REV. 939, 955 (1938).
"'The rule is followed at the present time in practically all American
jurisdictions, in respect to transactions involving both real and personal
property, that one to whom a positive, distinct, and definite representation
has been made is entitled to rely on such representation and need not make
further inquiry concerning the particular facts involved.'"
Rummer v. Throop, 38 Wash. 2d 624, 633, 231 P.2d 313, 319 (1951) (quoting
Cunningham v. Studio Theatre, Inc., 38 Wash. 2d 417, 424, 229 P.2d 890, 894 (1951))
(quoting 23 AM. JUR. Fraud and Deceit § 161 (1938))).
27. In earlier decisions upon the subject, a great deal of stress was laid on
inequality of access to the facts, and this may once have been a requirement for
liability. See, e.g., Smith v. Richards, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 26 (1839).
[W]herever a sale is made of property not present, but at a remote distance,
which the seller knows the purchaser has never seen, but which he buys upon
the representation of the seller, relying on its truth, then the representation, in
effect, amounts to a warranty; at least, that the seller is bound to make good
the representation.
Id. at 72.
The tendency of more recent cases is to extend the buyer's right to rely on
statements of fact by the seller even where he "may have been foolishly credulous in
doing this," so long as the buyer does not actually see or know the falsity of the
statement. Rummer v. Throop, 38 Wash. 2d 624, 634, 231 P.2d 313, 319 (1951). "[I]t is
immaterial that the means of knowledge are open to the complaining party, or easily
available to him, and that he may ascertain the truth by proper inquiry or
investigation." Id. at 633, 231 P.2d at 319 (quoting Cunningham v. Studio Theatre,
Inc., 38 Wash. 2d 417, 425, 229 P.2d 890, 894 (1951) (quoting 23 AM. JUR. Fraud and
Deceit § 161 (1938))). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 540 (1977).
This overlaps the problem of the plaintiff's justifiable reliance on defendant's
statement. See § 8 infra.
28. Thus an agent who makes positive representations on behalf of his principal
has been held strictly liable. Angell v. Loomis, 97 Mich. 5, 55 N.W. 1008 (1893); Tischer
v. Bardin, 155 Minn. 361, 194 N.W. 3 (1923). So has the president of a bank for whose
credit he induced another bank to purchase commercial paper. Peterson v. Schaberg,
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Few actual decisions go beyond this point whether they adopt
outright a rule of strict liability or reach the same result through
29
manipulating scienter by imposing an absolute duty to know. And
liability for false statements in a registration statement required by
the Federal Securities Acts may be defeated (except by the issuer) by
30
a showing of due diligence.
Another possible basis for strict liability in some cases is the
notion of enterprise liability - that an enterprise which inevitably
116 Neb. 346, 217 N.W. 586 (1928) (the Nebraska rule "practically charges the
defendant with notice of the truth in all cases where he makes positive representations of known facts."). Id. at 349, 217 N.W. at 587 (quoting Holtry v. Foley, 43 Neb.
133, 137, 61 N.W. 120,122 (1894)). See also Osborne v. Holt, 92 W. Va. 410, 114 S.E. 801
(1922). But cf. § 5 at note 5 supra (scienter requirement sometimes applied where
defendant is a broker or agent).
For the rule governing the agent's liability in Michigan, compare Krause v.
Cook, 144 Mich. 365, 108 N.W. 81 (1906) with Aldrich v. Scribner, 154 Mich. 23, 27-32,
117 N.W. 581, 583-84 (1908) (discussing Krause). See Irwin v. Carlton, 369 Mich. 92,
95-96, 119 N.W.2d 617, 619 (1963) (discussing the distinction between Krause and
Aldrich). These decisions indicate that an agent will not be liable for an innocent
repetition of his principal's misstatement of fact where plaintiffs loss greatly exceeds
defendant's commission, although the Aldrich case suggests that recovery would be
allowed if there were some way to measure damages in a fraud action by defendant's
gain rather than plaintiffs loss. See note 17 supra. Cf. People's Furn. & Appl. Co. v.
Healy, 365 Mich. 522, 526, 113 N.W.2d 802, 804 (1962) (real estate broker, sued for
return of deposit held by him as result of sale induced by his innocent misrepresentation, liable in amount of the deposit since to this extent plaintiff's loss "has inured to
the benefit of the defendant.").
Similarly, a doctrine of "innocent misrepresentation or constructive fraud"
has been applied in New Mexico to impose strict liability on the seller himself for
buyer's damages from a misrepresentation in a multiple listing service that a house
had a wood-burning fireplace. Archuleta v. Kopp, 90 N.M. 273, 562 P.2d 834, 837
(1977). In fact the fireplace was not functional, and was moreover a fire hazard.
Plaintiff, who was blind, could not detect these defects on inspection, and at least one
judge thought the defects "would not have been visible to plaintiff even if he could see
....
Id. at __,
562 P.2d at 841. The appellate court accepted, with obvious
skepticism, findings by the trial court that the misrepresentation was neither
intentional nor negligent; noting that plaintiff suffered smoke damage to the house
when he tried to ignite a fire in the fireplace, and also that the fireplace would have to
be rebuilt to correct its defects, it remanded to the trial court for a determination of
damages, without specifying how they should be computed, but clearly without
reference to the amount of seller's profit on the sale.
Frequently buyer's loss, measured by the "out-of-pocket" rule, see § 15 at note
5 infra, may also be the measure of seller's benefit by way of unjust enrichment, in
which case there should be no hesitation to award damages for such loss, in the
absence of subversion of other vital policies. See, e.g., Yates v. Tindall & Son Pontiac,
531 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1976) (defendant, who innocently sold a used car with false
odometer reading, held liable to buyer for difference between price buyer paid and the
actual fair market value of the vehicle if correctly described).
29. But cf. National Bank of Pawnee v. Hamilton, 202 Ill. App. 516 (1916)
(representer held liable for false representations of fact though he did not volunteer
information and apparently did not benefit by plaintiffs actions).
30. See § 6 at notes 33 to 36 and accompanying text supra.
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causes losses of a certain kind may justly be called upon to
compensate its victims and administer these losses as part of its cost
of doing business or carrying on the enterprise. 3 1 This ground of
liability ha6 loomed large in products liability cases recently where it
overlaps the first consideration noted above. 32 It may also conceivably compete with negligence as the proper basis of liability for
misstatements by those in the business of getting and communicating information, though there seems to be no perceptible trend in
this direction.
31. See generally Hall v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 368-69
(E.D.N.Y. 1972).
32. See notes 20 to 22 and accompanying text supra.

Part II of this article, comprising Section 8 to 15, will appear in
Volume 37 No. 3 of the Maryland Law Review.

